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The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act effectively repealed aspects of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by creating a new statutory section governing joinder of
accused infringers and consolidation of actions for trial in most patent infringement
cases. This new law codifies a substantial barrier to joinder and consolidation for
trial. In so doing, it frustrates the promotion of liberal standards both for evaluating
the sufficiency of pleadings and for evaluating the propriety of joinder of parties-
two of the primary policies embraced by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Remarkably, Congress adopted the new statutory section despite the
absence of any detailed scholarly analysis prior to its enactment regarding these
issues, sparse legislative history analyzing perceived problems with the relevant
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the lack of any consideration of the new
statutory section by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. This
Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the enactment of the
new statutory section, the competing policies animating the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the appropriate interpre-
tation and application of the new law. Such analyses have, to date, been absent
from the legal conversation.
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INTRODUCTION
Until September 16, 2011, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
with limited exceptions, governed both permissive joinder of parties
and consolidation of actions for trial in almost any type of federal civil
litigation.' On that day, President Obama signed into law 2 the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA),3 which created a new statutory
section (35 U.S.C. § 299) governing these issues in most cases arising
under the patent laws of the United States.4 In enacting this new stat-
utory section, Congress and the President took a significant step
toward correcting a perceived problem plaguing patent infringement
litigation-so-called "patent trolls" joining numerous unrelated
accused infringers in inconvenient venues.5
In considering the laudable goal of correcting this perceived
problem, however, one should not overlook the unique and radical
aspects of the solution. Notably, 35 U.S.C. § 299 overrides the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that the section is inconsistent
1 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81."); FED. R. Civ.
P. 20 (governing permissive joinder of parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (governing consolidation
of actions for trial); FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (listing the limited exceptions to the applicability
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
2 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, White House, President Obama Signs
America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and
Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-
invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
3 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
4 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013) (providing that the new statutory section regarding joinder applies "[w]ith
respect to any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, other than
an action or trial in which an act of infringement under section 271(e)(2) has been pled").
The exception for cases involving section 271(e)(2) claims means that cases with allegations
of infringement related to certain drugs and veterinary biological products are not subject
to § 299. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006) (making it an act of infringement to submit
applications for certain patented drugs and veterinary biological products).
5 Early commentators on § 299 highlighted its effect on "nonpracticing entities," pejo-
ratively called "patent trolls." See, e.g., Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Rush to Judg-
ment: New Dis-joinder Rules and Non-practicing Entities, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Sept. 20,
2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rush-to-judgment-new
-dis-joinder-rules-and-non-practicing-entities.html ("The dis-joinder provisions were put in
place as a hurdle for non-practicing entities alleging infringement across an industry.");
Charles Gorenstein, America Invents Act Exercises "Con-Troll" over Patent Litigation,
IPWATCHDOG BLOG (Sept. 19, 2011, 3:50 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/19/
con-troll-over-patent-litigation/id=19279/ ("This provision appears to effectively put an end
to what has become an all-to[o]-common mode of wholesale patent enforcement by
patent-owning organizations referred to politely as 'non-practicing entities."'). For an
explanation of what characteristics qualify a litigant as a "patent troll" or "nonpracticing
entity," see infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
654 [Vol. 88:652
PA TENT MISJOINDER
with them.6 It creates procedural rules governing only a subset of one
type of litigation in federal district court: patent infringement litiga-
tion.7 It constructs a substantial barrier for plaintiffs who wish to join
accused infringers in one case and in one trial.8 It imposes upon courts
and patent owners the prospect of litigating the same factual and legal
questions numerous times-an inefficient process with the attendant
substantive risk to patent owners of issue preclusion.9 Furthermore, it
contradicts primary policies embraced by the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: the promotion of liberal standards for evalu-
ating the sufficiency of pleadings and for evaluating the propriety of
joinder of parties and consolidation of actions.10
Given these unique and radical aspects of § 299,11 it is remark-
able that Congress enacted it without the benefit of scholarly analysis
6 See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[A] statute passed
after the effective date of a federal rule repeals the rule to the extent that it actually con-
flicts." (quoting Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
7 Beyond the exception already noted, see supra note 4, the new statutory section dis-
tinguishes between, on the one hand, civil actions "arising under any Act of Congress
relating to patents" and, on the other hand, civil actions not arising under federal patent
statutes. See 35 U.S.C. § 299. Thus, § 299 continues to distinguish cases with patent-law
claims from cases with only patent-law counterclaims. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-30 (2002) (holding that the correct interpreta-
tion of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) limits the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction to cases in
which "[t]he plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint" asserts a claim arising under federal patent
law and that a counterclaim will not constitute a valid basis for "arising under" jurisdic-
tion); see also infra Part III.A.1 (describing how § 299 perpetuates the problem identified
in Holmes Group).
8 The impact of that barrier will depend on the interpretation of § 299. See infra Part
IV (describing both liberal and restrictive interpretations of § 299). But § 299 unmistakably
narrows the grounds for permissive joinder of accused infringers when compared to both
prongs of the test articulated in Rule 20(b). See infra Part III.A.2 (concluding that § 299
restricts at least some of the discretion previously afforded to both patent owners and
courts under Rule 20).
9 If allegations do not relate to infringement of "the same accused product or process,"
the accused infringers "may not be joined in one action ... or have their actions consoli-
dated for trial," even if the resulting two lawsuits involve common questions of fact or law.
35 U.S.C. § 299. This increases the chance that an accused infringer will obtain a judgment
of invalidity, which would impact future lawsuits given the doctrine of issue preclusion. See
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (overruling
prior case law "to the extent it foreclose[d] a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of
infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid").
10 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 987,
990-91 (2003) (noting that, under the Federal Rules, pleadings must merely "provid[e]
notice of the claim asserted"); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CM. L. REV. 494, 521 (1986) ("The 1938 Rules deliberately liberalized
joinder practice . . . .").
11 The joinder rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embrace prior equity prac-
tice and its insistence on liberal pleading, broad joinder, and discretion. See Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
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regarding permissive joinder of accused infringers or consolidation in
patent infringement litigation.12 Similarly troubling, there is sparse
legislative history analyzing perceived problems with the relevant
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 In fact, neither the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts or its Advisory Committee on Civil Rules appears even to
have considered the legislation prior to its enactment.14 This Article
provides the necessary comprehensive analysis that has so far been
absent from the legal conversation.
By creating a new statutory section that governs permissive
joinder of accused infringers in most patent cases, Congress and the
President effectively resolved a split of authority among federal
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1987) ("[A] historical examination of
the evolution of the Federal Rules reveals that rules of equity prevailed over common law
procedure."). Section 19(d) of the America Invents Act (AIA), by contrast, reflects views
"rooted in a common law tradition that embraced definition and control." See id. at 975
(noting that such views were typical of "those opposed to the uniform federal rules move-
ment"). Thus, while § 299 is "unique and radical" compared to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Rules themselves "were revolutionary in their approach and impact
because they borrowed so much from equity and rejected so many of the restraining and
narrowing features of historic common law procedure." Id. at 925. One might say, there-
fore, that § 299 merely "revisit[s] our common law heritage." See id. at 1002 (recalling that
"law and equity developed as companions").
12 Scholars offered scant analysis relevant to these concepts prior to 2011-and what
was published was sporadic and largely disconnected. See, e.g., Mary Kay Kane, Original
Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1746 & n.101
(1998) (citing a decision refusing joinder of defendants in the context of a patent infringe-
ment case to highlight distinct interpretations of the term "transaction" in Rules 13 and
20); Donald W. Rupert & Daniel H. Shulman, Clarifying, Confusing, or Changing the
Legal Landscape: A Sampling of Recent Cases from the Federal Circuit, 19 FED. CIR. B.J.
521, 543-44 (2010) (explaining that "if Rule 20 is strictly enforced by the district courts,
there is a possibility that even a multiple defendant case could be split apart for venue
transfer purposes" because "the patent owner's asserted right does not necessarily arise
out of the same transactions or occurrences for all defendants because defendants' prod-
ucts are often different and their proofs of noninfringement may vary"); Edward Hsieh,
Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 683, 684 (2004) (arguing that "[m]andatory joinder [of accused infringers] would
facilitate cooperation and reduce the scourge of bad patents by consolidating all defen-
dants in a single action").
13 The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary indicated that the Act
"addresses problems occasioned by the joinder of defendants (sometimes numbering in the
dozens) who have tenuous connections to the underlying disputes in patent infringement
suits." H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54 (2011). The Committee, however, did not identify
any specific problems. Id.; see also infra Part III.B (analyzing the relevant legislative
history).
14 Shortly after passage of the AIA, I contacted the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts by letter regarding whether
it or its Advisory Committee on Civil Rules considered the AIA prior to its enactment. A
representative eventually notified me by telephone that committee members had not been
able to identify any consideration of the legislation prior to its enactment.
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district judges about the proper interpretation and application of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 42 in patent infringement
litigation.15 Some judges, including judges in the Eastern District of
Texas, the Northern District of Texas, the District of Kansas, and the
Eastern District of Louisiana, had interpreted Rules 20 and 42
broadly. For example, these judges interpreted the Rules to permit
joinder of accused infringers based on allegations of infringement of
the same patent unless, after discovery, the accused infringers proved
that their accused products or processes were dramatically different.16
Other judges, including a different judge in the Eastern District of
Texas as well as judges in the Northern District of California, the
Northern District of Illinois, and the Western District of Washington,
had interpreted the rules much more narrowly. These judges inter-
preted Rule 20 to permit joinder of accused infringers only if the
accused infringers and the accused products or processes were related,
the accused infringers acted in concert, or the accused products or
processes were very similar.'7
15 Ironically, several months after enactment of § 299, the Federal Circuit resolved the
split of authority regarding the proper interpretation of Rule 20 in patent infringement
cases. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (acknowledging the split
and ultimately concluding that "joinder is not appropriate where different products or
processes are involved"). As the court highlighted, the President signed the AIA into law
just days after the petitioner filed its petition, and therefore the Federal Circuit's "decision
will only govern a number of cases that were filed before the passage of the new joinder
provision." Id. at 1355-56.
16 See MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 457 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
("[S]everance could be appropriate if the defendants' methods or products were dramati-
cally different.. . . Here, the parties have not completed fact discovery, and the Court is not
in a position to determine whether the [accused infringer's] products or methods are sub-
stantially similar or dissimilar to the other defendants'."); Sprint Commc'ns Co. v.
Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 617-18 (D. Kan. 2006) (citing MyMail for the proposi-
tion that a strict interpretation of Rule 20 would run counter to the principle of judicial
economy and denying severance in the case at bar); Centre One v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
No. 6:08CV467, 2009 WL 2461003, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (same); Adrain v.
Genetec Inc., No. 2:08-CV-423, 2009 WL 3063414, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009)
(same); Mannatech, Inc. v. Country Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574, at
*1-2 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) (citing Adrain and denying severance); Alford Safety Servs.,
Inc. v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233, at *9-10 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010)
(citing MyMail and denying severance); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-
CV-446, 2010 WL 3835762, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010) (same).
17 See, e.g., Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., No. C10-1385, 2011 WL 1655713, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2011) (severing defendants because, -while they were accused of
infringing patents in similar ways, each defendant "operates differently and offers products
that often compete with those of other [d]efendants"); Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp., No. 09-
cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (finding that defendants' alleged
acts of infringement were "unrelated" and therefore granting motion to sever); WiAV
Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *3-4 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (dismissing all but the first named defendant because the plaintiff did not
allege that the defendants engaged in related activities or otherwise acted in concert); Reid
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Like these latter judges, § 299 advances a narrow rule regarding
permissive joinder of accused infringers and consolidation of separate
patent infringement actions for trial. Absent waiver by the accused
infringers, § 299 restricts joinder and consolidation for trial to situa-
tions in which the accused infringers allegedly infringe using "the
same accused product or process" and in which questions of fact
common to all accused infringers will arise.' 8 The new statutory sec-
tion, again absent waiver, also eliminates the ability to join accused
infringers or consolidate actions for trial "based solely on allegations
that they each have infringed the patent or patents in suit." 19
Beyond its resolution of diverging judicial interpretations of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, § 299 likely reflects discontent
regarding the high cost of patent infringement litigation,20 coupled
with the loss of individualized defenses to alleged infringement.
Joinder, of course, may be efficient for patent owners, accused
infringers, affected third parties, and courts.21 Furthermore, consoli-
dating trial presentations could likewise reduce costs by eliminating
duplicative efforts by litigants, courts, and juries. But joinder and con-
solidation for trial also create costs unknown to lawsuits involving
individual accused infringers. For example, when a patent owner joins
claims against multiple accused infringers in one lawsuit, each accused
infringer has added incentive to monitor information and activities
associated with other accused infringers in order to minimize potential
prejudice, an expensive endeavor. Moreover, joinder and consolida-
tion for trial also eliminate many individualized opportunities for dis-
covery and presentation of positions to the court or jury. 22 Section 299
may reflect a judgment that the efficiency gains from joinder and con-
solidation do not justify these costs and this loss of individualization.
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 240 F.R.D. 260, 263 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (granting severance because
each of the "primary defendants" had "its own" accused product and noting that allega-
tions of infringement against unrelated parties based on different acts do not arise from the
same transaction).
18 35 U.S.C. § 299(a) (Supp. V 2012) (amended 2013).
19 Id.
20 In 2011, parties incurred a median total cost of $2.5 million in patent infringement
lawsuits with between $1 million and $25 million at risk. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N, 2011
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2011). Beyond this raw data, an empirical study
has shown that the broad category of intellectual property cases, which includes patent
infringement cases, has costs substantially higher than other types of cases. See EMERY G.
LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES:
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 8 (2010) ("In terms of nature-of-suit categories, Intellectual
Property cases had costs almost 62% higher, all else equal, than the baseline 'Other'
category.").
21 For a discussion of joinder-related efficiencies experienced by patent owners, see
infra Part II.A.1.
22 See infra Part II.A.2.
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Section 299 also likely reflects recent and continued concern
about forum shopping by patent owners, particularly forum shopping
favoring the Eastern District of Texas. Indeed, the legislative history
of the AIA indicates that Congress was targeting the Eastern District
of Texas.23 Notably, since 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("the Federal Circuit") has issued nine writs of man-
damus ordering the Eastern District of Texas to transfer patent
infringement cases to more convenient forums,24 and one additional
writ of mandamus ordering the Eastern District of Texas to reconsider
a denial of transfer to an allegedly more convenient forum.25 How-
ever, if a patent owner names a number of accused infringers in a
complaint filed in the Eastern District of Texas, and at least one or
more of the accused infringers is headquartered in or near the Eastern
District of Texas or has significant ties to it, the patent owner may be
able to avoid transfer.26
To examine joinder practice in the Eastern District of Texas and
its potential relationship with forum shopping, I conducted a study
23 See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt.1, at 55 n.61 (2011) (noting that the new statutory
section "legislatively abrogates" the construction of Rule 20(a) adopted in seven cases,
four issued by the Eastern District of Texas); 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) ("This provision effectively codifies current law as it has
been applied everywhere outside of the Eastern District of Texas."). This is not the first
time members of Congress have targeted the Eastern District of Texas and its handling of
patent cases. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85
IND. L.J. 449, 483-88 (2010) (describing efforts to exclude Eastern District of Texas judges
from a congressionally sponsored pilot program intended to provide training and addi-
tional funding to district court judges willing to hear patent cases); Xuan-Thao Nguyen,
Justice Scalia's "Renegade Jurisdiction": Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV.
111, 143-44 (2008) (describing congressional testimony citing the Eastern District of Texas
"as an example of patent litigation ... abuse" and describing interest group "lobby[ing] for
reforms to end forum shopping").
24 See In re Morgan Stanley, 417 F. App'x 947, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (ordering the
transfer of the case at bar from the Eastern District); In re Verizon Bus. Network Servs.
Inc., 635 F.3d 559, 560-61 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (same); In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(same); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same);
In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re
Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re TS Tech USA
Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same).
25 See In re Oracle Corp., 399 F. App'x 587, 587-88, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating the
Eastern District of Texas's denial of the motion to transfer and ordering it to undertake a
"proper ... analysis" of the motion).
26 See, e.g., In re Google Inc., 412 F. App'x 295 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that the
Eastern District of Texas did not abuse its discretion in prioritizing judicial economy and its
local interest in deciding the matter given that four accused infringers resided in the dis-
trict, and denying petition for writ of mandamus to order the court to transfer the entire
action or to sever and transfer the petitioner's claims, despite the fact that another district
would have been more convenient for seven other defendants residing there).
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comparing initial complaints alleging patent infringement filed in the
Eastern District of Texas with those filed in the Northern District of
California. My study reveals a stark difference both in the number of
accused infringers identified in initial complaints filed in the two
forums and in the proportion of accused infringers identified as having
ties to the two districts' states.27 Collectively, the information suggests
that § 299 may reflect Congress's rejection of the tactic of naming
local defendants as anchors to avoid transfer of cases involving other,
non-local defendants to forums more convenient to the non-local
defendants. 28
Another factor that likely influenced the passage of § 299 is con-
cern with so-called "nonpracticing entities," or "patent trolls." These
entities exist solely to own and assert patents, do not provide any
products or services, and so do not use the technology covered by
their patents. 29 They may seek inflated licensing revenues based on
the high cost and risk associated with defending patent infringement
litigation.30 Indeed, commentators identify forum shopping by patent
owners as a contributing factor to the "patent troll" phenomenon
often associated with the Eastern District of Texas.31 This Article
addresses all these potential justifications for enactment of § 299.
27 See infra Appendix (presenting various figures summarizing the results of the study).
28 See infra Part II.A.3 (analyzing the incentives for patent owners to name accused
infringers with ties to the forum in order to avoid transfer).
29 See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 210 (D.
Mass. 2008) (defining "[p]atent trolls" as "'nonpracticing entities' who 'do not manufac-
ture products, but instead hold . .. patents, which they license and enforce against alleged
infringers'" (quoting Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911
(W.D. Wis. 2007), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2009))); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1600-01 (2011) ("The term 'patent troll' has been generally, if some-
what loosely, defined in the literature as a 'nonpracticing entity,' an entity that has never
commercialized or 'practiced' its patented technology." (citation omitted)).
30 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the
Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 62 (2009) (noting that "patentees who are non-
producing and engage in hold-up behavior have been labeled 'patent trolls"' and
explaining that hold-up behavior involves "acquiring [patent] claims and threatening or
pursuing litigation ... [to] seek and often receive economic settlements from genuine inno-
vators and producers that greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in ques-
tion" (first alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Yahoo! Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 6, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-
130), 2006 WL 218988, at *6)); Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, The State of Patent Litigation, Address at the Eastern District of Texas
Bench Bar Conference 17 (Sept. 27, 2011) ("I have always preferred an alternative defini-
tion of a [patent] 'troll,' namely, any party that attempts to enforce a patent far beyond its
actual value or contribution to the prior art.") (transcript available at http://www.patentlyo.
com/files/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf).
31 See Andrei lancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws
Patent Cases-Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 300 (2011)
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Beyond normative justifications for the new law, § 299 presents
important questions regarding interpretation and application. There
are many aspects of the new statutory section that are, at a minimum,
ambiguous.32 Furthermore, depending upon its interpretation and
application, the new statutory section may eliminate efficiencies in an
important subset of cases.33
In this Article, I consider possible interpretations of § 299.34 I
suggest that courts interpret the text of the statute, particularly the
"same accused product or process" language, with an eye toward
increasing efficiency and reducing prejudice to accused infringers by
focusing on whether complaints identify concerted action by accused
infringers. 35 Under my proposal, a good faith allegation of concerted
action should be treated as raising a rebuttable presumption that the
accused product or process is "the same," with the ultimate decision
turning on whether the accused products or methods are indistinguish-
able in any relevant respect. 36
This Article is organized into four parts. Part I reviews the devel-
opment of the law governing permissive joinder of defendants in fed-
eral court. Part II studies joinder and misjoinder of accused infringers
in modern patent infringement litigation prior to enactment of the
(recognizing that the Eastern District of Texas has been called "a hotbed for 'patent
trolls"' (quoting Peter Lattman, Patent Trolls: Grazing the Piney Woods?, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Mar. 27, 2006, 12:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/03/27/are-patent-trolls-
grazing-the-east-texas-plains)); Adam D. Kline, Any Given Forum: A Proposed Solution to
the Inequitable Economic Advantage That Arises When Non-practicing Patent Holding
Organizations Predetermine Forum, 48 IDEA 247, 275 (2008) ("There is little doubt that a
patent holding organization has the motivation to ensure that its patent cases will be heard
in the Eastern District of Texas."); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An
Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum
for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 214 (2007) ("The combination of the local
juries' respect for personal property rights and government agencies and their distrust of
large corporate defendants makes the Eastern District of Texas an ideal venue for 'patent
trolls."'); Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent
Litigation and Implications for Non-practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 77
(2010) (arguing that while the Eastern District of Texas "has served as a second home" for
non-practicing entities, writs of mandamus by the Federal Circuit ordering the Eastern
District of Texas to transfer cases discourages forum shopping and reduces the leverage
patent litigation provides to non-practicing entities to obtain licensing revenues).
32 Paul Michel, former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, described the AIA as
including "'many sections [that] are poorly written and ambiguous."' Jan Wolfe, What
Effects Will the America Invents Act Have on U.S. Patent Law?, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 13,
2011), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=12025141
70593.
33 See infra Part IV (analyzing competing interpretations of the operative language in
§ 299 and their application to various hypothetical situations).
34 See infra Part IV.A.
35 See infra Part IV.C.
36 Id.
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AIA. It analyzes the conflicting authority regarding interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
context of patent infringement litigation generally and in the context
of divergent practices by patent owners filing complaints in the
Northern District of California and the Eastern District of Texas in
particular. Part III analyzes the new statutory section governing per-
missive joinder and consolidation in most patent infringement litiga-
tion, how it differs from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and its
legislative history. Part IV highlights open questions regarding the
interpretation and application of the new statutory section and pro-
poses a doctrinal approach that would increase efficiencies and elimi-
nate unfair prejudice.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAw GOVERNING JOINDER
OF DEFENDANTS
It is important to consider the development of the law governing
joinder of defendants generally before analyzing the attitudes in
patent infringement litigation toward joinder of accused infringers and
the proper interpretation and application of § 299. In particular, in
this Part, I discuss the competing policies put forward during the
drafting of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that governs permis-
sive joinder, as well as the body of common law reflecting judges'
views about the proper application of that rule outside the context of
patent infringement litigation.
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Permissive Joinder
of Parties
Prior to the AIA, the relevant law governing permissive joinder
of parties in all patent infringement litigation was Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 20. With respect to joinder of defendants, the rule
includes two prongs. Persons may be joined in one lawsuit as defen-
dants if (1) "any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, sever-
ally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" and
(2) "any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in
the action." 37
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
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1. The Drafting of Rule 20
An Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme Court
drafted Rule 20.38 The initial draft rule regarding joinder of parties
differed significantly from what ultimately became Rule 20. The initial
draft effectively required only the second prong-a common question
of law or fact-to join defendants in one lawsuit.39
At least one member of the Advisory Committee, upon presenta-
tion of the initial draft, questioned whether the United States should
be permitted to sue "all the delinquent taxpayers in one suit"
(assuming the United States could obtain jurisdiction over the tax-
payers) if the taxpayers all claimed invalidity of the income tax laws. 40
Thereafter the members of the committee engaged in a wide-ranging
debate concerning the merits of the initial draft rule and its single-
pronged test for joinder of parties based on a common question of law
or fact.41 At the conclusion of that debate, the committee rejected the
initial draft rule and instead voted to adopt the English rule governing
permissive joinder of both plaintiffs and defendants. 42 In doing so,
they incorporated the first prong into the test for permissive joinder of
plaintiffs and defendants-the "same transaction or series of transac-
tions" requirement. 43
38 Order, Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law
Rules, 295 U.S. 774, 774-75 (1935) (appointing a committee of fifteen members to prepare
a "unified system of general rules" for the federal courts).
39 The initial draft read:
All persons [subject to the jurisdiction of the court] may join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one action where any question of law or facts is
common to all the rights of action sought to be enforced. Such persons may be
interested, or be liable, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, but need not be
interested in obtaining or defending all the relief prayed for.
PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT TO DRAFT UNIFORM RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA UNDER THE Act OF CONGRESS PROVIDING FOR SUCH UNIFORM OR UNIFIED
RULES 476-77 (Nov. 14, 1935) (alteration in original) (on file with the New York University
Law Review) [hereinafter NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS].
40 Id. at 466.
41 Id. at 474-515.
42 Id. at 514-15. At the time, the relevant English rule read:
All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transac-
tions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where if
such persons brought separate actions any common question of law or fact
would arise; provided that, if upon the application of any defendant it shall
appear that such joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the
court or a judge may order separate trials, or make such other order as may be
expedient . . ..
RSC, 0. XVI, Rule 1, Annual Practice (1937) 213-14 (Eng.).
43 Compare id. with FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
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Beyond highlighting the importance of the first prong of Rule 20,
the Advisory Committee's deliberation indicates that committee
members were motivated by different and sometimes conflicting rea-
sons for passing Rule 20's two-pronged test. On the one hand, some
committee members attempted to liberalize joinder of parties. For
example, they sought to prevent adjudication of disputes regarding
the propriety of joinder, including disputes regarding the interpreta-
tion of the language of the governing rule.4 4 On the other hand, other
committee members wanted to impose at least loose restrictions on
joinder of parties. They sought to require something more than a
common question of law to effectuate joinder.45 They expressed con-
cerns with undue hardships placed on inappropriately joined defen-
dants, including added expenses and duties as well as collective action
problems. 46 Some committee members also voiced worries about
giving judges too much discretion to determine the propriety of
joinder.47
The Advisory Committee's deliberation also indicates, perhaps
surprisingly, that the exact meaning of the language in the first
prong-which at the time recited "arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions"-was unclear to at least some of the com-
mittee members. 48 The Committee effectively delegated the interpre-
tation of the similar phrase in Rule 20 to the courts. The ensuing
judicial disagreement over its meaning and application in patent cases
ultimately led to the enactment of § 299.
2. Scholarly Analysis of Rule 20
Scholars have attempted to provide guidance for courts inter-
preting the first prong of Rule 20, which requires determining whether
44 See NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 501-02 (quoting a committee
member as seeking a system shifting the basis of disputes from "fighting over the bare
bones of whether . . . paper documents should be together or should be separate" to "the
convenient way of trying the cases"). While committee members sought to focus attention
on substantive rather than procedural disputes and therefore reduce costs associated with
pleading, their rules actually diminished the significance of both pleading and trial.
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis.
L. REV. 631, 647. Moreover, those rules ultimately substituted a series of intermediate
stages of litigation, including questions of joinder, in place of trials. Id. Thus, it is ironic
that "joinder of parties and claims was rarely disputed under the common law and Code
procedures but has become an important source of tactical jockeying under the Rules." Id.
at 654. Indeed, "the joinder rules yield pretrial motions and opportunities for strategic
maneuvering that have potentially great bearing on the outcome of a case." Id.
45 NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 466, 487-88, 497-98, 509-10.
46 Id. at 470, 490-91, 497-98, 502, 504-05, 512-a.
47 Id. at 505-08.
48 Id. at 487, 512-a.
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"any right to relief is asserted against [the defendants] jointly, sever-
ally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences." 4 9
Professor Mary Kay Kane argues that courts cannot determine
what constitutes a transaction without considering (1) the facts of each
case; (2) whether allowing joinder of multiple defendants will further
convenience and judicial economy; and (3) whether joinder will
"promot[e] decisions on the merits, rather than relying on rigid rules
or technicalities."50 In her view, a conclusion that the "transaction"
standard of Rule 20 is not met "[e]ffectively . . . represents a determi-
nation that efficiency concerns would not be clearly promoted by
joinder and may be outweighed by the complications introduced into
the case by including the additional parties."5 1
Professor Robin Effron agrees that the joinder rules should be
interpreted based on the underlying policies. 52 Indeed, she suggests
that there is such an "inadequate fit between the purpose of the rules
and the terminology" used in the rules that the best course of action is
to abandon the twin requirements of Rule 20-the "common ques-
tion" and "transaction or occurrence" requirements-and instead
focus on the underlying "policy and managerial concerns that already
drive joinder decisions." 53 With respect to permissive joinder, she sug-
gests that judges consider separately the efficiencies gained or lost by
holding a common trial and the efficiencies gained or lost by consoli-
dating other aspects of litigation.54 Given that most cases settle, she
suggests that "issues of joint trials should not loom so large in the
initial joinder decision and should be dealt with separately . . . when
the possibility of a trial becomes a reality."55
Professor Douglas McFarland also advocates a policy-based
approach to application of the rules governing joinder. In particular,
he embraces the proposition that the "original intent of permissive
joinder [is] to allow almost free joinder of parties" 56 and criticizes
49 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
50 Kane, supra note 12, at 1747.
51 Id. at 1746; see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.4, at 330-31 (1985) (adopting and defining a functional
"logical relationship" test "in terms of judicial economy and convenience").
52 Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEo. L.J. 759, 762 (2012).
53 Id. at 772, 815.
54 Id. at 817.
55 Id.
56 Douglas D. McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction or
Occurrence and the Claim Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 247, 265-66
(2011) ("Despite this clear intent, over the years, courts have been more and more willing
to seize on the words of the rule for exclusion, rather than for inclusion, of additional
parties; they continue to be 'skeptical of a natural unity to disputes.'" (quoting
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almost any opinion finding misjoinder of parties.57 He suggests that
"the permissive joinder of parties rule closely approached freejoinder" and that "the only substantial restriction [is] . . . the common
question requirement, not the transaction or occurrence require-
ment."58 Regarding the meaning of "transaction or occurrence," he
advocates for "a common core of operative facts" 59 or "a set of facts
that a layperson would expect to be tried together." 60 He explains that
a transaction or occurrence "is one litigable event, one cluster of real
world events, one set of facts." 61 Regarding the meaning of a "series"
of transactions or occurrences, he embraces the concept of a "logical
relationship" and suggests thinking of a series of transactions or
occurrences as "links in a chain."62 Thus, Professor McFarland seeks
to advance the policy of liberal joinder through specific, broad inter-
pretations of the language of the "transaction or occurrence" require-
ment in Rule 20.
However, while some members of the Advisory Committee that
drafted Rule 20 did cite objectives and policies favoring liberaljoinder,63 other committee members cited objectives and policies
favoring loose restraints on joinder, including preventing hardships on
defendants and providing at least some restriction on the discretion of
trial judges to create those hardships.64 And while the original goal of
Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106-07 n.360
(1989))).
57 Id. at 265-70 (discussing a number of cases as well as statistical evidence, noting that
"[o]ne has to search long and hard for a decision that may have too generously allowed
permissive joinder" and concluding that "courts should approve permissive joinder almost
as a matter of course").
58 Id. at 260-61 (citation omitted); see also id. at 270 (stating that "the drafters of the
permissive joinder rule selected 'transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences' as terms of inclusion intended to lead to nearly free joinder of parties" and encour-
aging decisions "in line with the general policies of the rules"). Significantly, the
conception that the drafters included the transaction-or-occurrence language as terms of
inclusion to lead to nearly free joinder of parties is inconsistent with the Advisory
Committee's deliberations. See NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 461-515.
59 McFarland, supra note 56, at 248-49.
60 Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or Occurrence: Counterclaims,
40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 732 (2007).
61 McFarland, supra note 56, at 262; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 79, at 527-28 (4th ed. 1983) (noting that a "transaction or occurrence"
can exist even when the evidence needed to prove two claims is different, provided the two
claims arise from "the same events").62 McFarland, supra note 56, at 264-65.
63 NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 461, 469-70, 501-02.
64 During the deliberations that led to Rule 20, some committee members specifically
advocated for inclusion of the "same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences" requirement in an effort to limit the ability to join parties on these policy-
based justifications. Id. at 470, 490-91, 497-98, 502, 504, 505-10, 512-a. Of course, these
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Charles Clark, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee, 65 was to
allow joinder of parties based only on the requirement of a common
question of law or fact,66 he ultimately amended the draft rule to
include the language "same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences." 6 7 Thus, if courts interpret Rule 20 based
on objectives and policy considerations, then they should consider all
of the objectives and policy considerations expressed by the Advisory
Committee. And while there is nothing inherently wrong with the
"logical relationship" test, in practice some courts stretched it to its
breaking point in patent infringement cases, as shown below, by per-
mitting joinder in practically every circumstance-without considering
whether multiple accused infringers are linked by "one litigable event,
one cluster of real world events, one set of facts." 68
B. Common Law Interpreting Rule 20 Outside of Patent
Infringement Litigation
Courts have developed a body of common law interpreting and
applying Rule 20 outside of patent infringement litigation. These cases
provide the necessary background and context for analyzing the diver-
gent interpretations of Rule 20 within the patent infringement field.
1. United States v. Mississippi
The only Supreme Court opinion specifically ruling on the ques-
tion of permissive joinder of parties and the application of Rule 20 is a
committee members prevailed: Rule 20 includes the "same transaction or occurrence or
series of transactions or occurrences" requirement. FED. R. Civ. P. 20. As another scholar
has recognized, these committee members' insistence on inclusion of this limitation on the
ability to join parties reflects a belief that all parties in one lawsuit should be connected to
the same dispute. See Bone, supra note 56, at 106 n.360 ("It is also possible that at least
some of the drafters thought that the commonality requirements expressed the factual and
legal unity that made a set of facts into a single 'legal dispute' and that they advocated
those requirements because they believed that a single lawsuit ought not adjudicate more
than one such legal dispute.").
65 See Order, Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law
Rules, 295 U.S. 774, 775 (1934) (naming Charles E. Clark the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee). Charles Clark was the Dean of Yale Law School at the time the Supreme
Court named him the Reporter. Id. at 774. Because he later became a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, I will refer to him in this article as Judge Clark.
66 See Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-Il.
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1319-23 (1935) (proposing standards for new
joinder rules not including the "same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences" requirement). For the deliberations resulting in the addition of this require-
ment to the rule governing permissive joinder of parties, see NOVEMBER 1935
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 460-515.
67 NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 515.
68 McFarland, supra note 56, at 262.
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1965 decision, United States v. Mississippi. 69 The district court had
found misjoinder and held that venue was improper as to various
defendants. 70 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that joinder was
authorized by Rule 20 and that venue, as a result, was proper.7 1 The
Court based its decision only on allegations in the complaint,72 which
asserted that some Mississippi voting registrars had acted and were
continuing to act as part of a "state-wide system designed to enforce
the registration laws in a way that would inevitably deprive colored
people of the right to vote solely because of their color." 7 3 In a terse
opinion, the Court held that the registrars "were alleged to be car-
rying on activities which were part of a series of transactions or occur-
rences the validity of which depended to a large extent upon
'question[s] of law or fact common to all of them.'" 7 4
Two aspects of the Supreme Court's opinion stand out. First, the
Court focused its inquiry on the allegations in the complaint, not on
any evidence developed through discovery or on allegations made in
motion papers. Second, the Court found satisfaction of both the trans-
action and common question prongs of Rule 20 based on the allega-
tion of concerted action by a group of defendants-a "state-wide
system designed to enforce the registration laws"75 in an illegal
manner. Notably, the Court did not reference any underlying policies
supporting liberal joinder of parties, whether identified by the
Advisory Committee or by scholars analyzing Rule 20.
2. The "Logical Relationship" Test
Given the dearth of Supreme Court precedent in this area and
the terseness of United States v. Mississippi, the leading case inter-
preting Rule 20 is a court of appeals decision, Mosley v. General
Motors Corp.76 Mosley involved an interlocutory appeal in which the
Eighth Circuit reversed a district court's order to sever plaintiffs who
alleged jointly that General Motors had a company-wide policy of
illegal discrimination.77
69 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
70 Id. at 142.
71 Id. at 143.
72 Id. at 142-43.
73 Id. at 142.
74 Id. at 143 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (1964) (amended
1966)).
75 Id. at 142.
76 497 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974). Other scholars have also identified Mosley as the
leading case governing permissive joinder of parties. See, e.g., McFarland, supra note 56, at
266-67 (noting that, "for many years, every permissive joinder of parties decision routinely
cited Mosley, and it remains the leading case today").
77 Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1332-34.
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Citing the policies of promoting trial convenience and expediting
final determinations of disputes, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the
language of the rule ("same transaction, occurrence, or series of trans-
actions or occurrences") flexibly to focus on "the[ ] logical relation-
ship" of various events.78 It proposed that all logically related events
giving rise to a claim comprise a transaction or occurrence. 9
According to the court, this interpretation "would permit all reason-
ably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be tried
in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is
unnecessary."8 0
To support its interpretation of the same transaction test, the
Eighth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decisions in United Mine
Workers of America v. Gibbs,8' Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange,82 and United States v. Mississippi.83 Only United States v.
Mississippi specifically addressed permissive joinder of parties and
Rule 20.
The Eighth Circuit relied upon Gibbs's prudential justifications
for expansive pendent jurisdiction. 84 In particular, it quoted the
Supreme Court's statement that the impulse of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is "toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of
action consistent with fairness to the parties" and that "joinder of
claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."85 A "strong
encouragement" to permit joinder of parties without being unfair
toward the parties, however, does not provide any real interpretive
guidance regarding Rule 20.
For this guidance, the Eighth Circuit relied upon Moore.86
Although this decision predated the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court interpreted the term "transac-
tion" in the context of Federal Rule of Equity 30,87 which governed
compulsory counterclaims.88 In particular, the Supreme Court stated
that "'[t]ransaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend
78 Id. at 1332-33 (quoting Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926)).
79 Id. at 1333.
80 Id.
81 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
82 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
83 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
84 Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1332-33.
85 Id. (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724).
86 Id. at 1333.
87 Federal Rule of Equity 30 was the precursor to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 advisory committee's note ("This is substantially [former] Equity
Rule 30 . . . .").
88 See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926) (interpreting FED. R.
EQury 30).
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a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the imme-
diateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." 89 The
Eighth Circuit relied on this description of a "logical relationship" as
the proper interpretation of "transaction" in the context of Rule 20.90
But what exactly is a "logical relationship"? For that matter, what is
an illogical relationship? The Eighth Circuit did not provide any inter-
pretive guidance, let alone any examples, other than its own holding in
Mosley and the holding of the Supreme Court in Mississippi.
The Eighth Circuit noted that its construction of the term "trans-
action" "accords with the result reached in United States v.
Mississippi."91 It focused on the fact that in the Mosley complaint,
"[e]ach of the ten plaintiffs alleged that he had been injured by the
same general policy of discrimination on the part of General
Motors." 9 2 It "conclude[d] that a company-wide policy purportedly
designed to discriminate against blacks in employment similarly arises
out of the same series of transactions or occurrences." 9 3 The Eighth
Circuit likewise found the common fact or law requirement satisfied. 94
Despite the lack of interpretive guidance in Mosley, at least one
scholar (Professor McFarland) has supported the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of "transaction," focusing on the "logical relationship"
among events. 95 Notably, however, neither the Supreme Court's nor
the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the word "transaction" is so
broad as to encompass separate actions by separate parties not based
on concerted action. In United States v. Mississippi, to justify joinder
of defendants, the Supreme Court highlighted the plaintiffs' allega-
tions of a statewide system designed to enforce voter registration laws
in a racially discriminatory way.9 6 Similarly, in Mosley, to justify
joinder of plaintiffs, the Eighth Circuit focused on an allegation of the
"same general policy of discrimination" by the defendant company. 97
The allegation that separate acts were part of a statewide system or a
company-wide policy was dispositive; these acts qualified as the "same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences"
because the cause (in the context of joining multiple defendants) or
effect (in the context of joining multiple plaintiffs) of the separate acts
89 Id. at 610.
90 Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1333-34.
94 Id. at 1334.
95 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing Douglas D. McFarland's sup-
port for the logical relationship test).
96 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142 (1965).
97 Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333.
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was alleged to be the result of concerted action. To the extent these
courts looked for a "logical relationship," they looked no further than
concerted action.
II
JOINDER OF ACCUSED INFRINGERS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT
When compared to the treatment of Rule 20 in some forums, the
AIA makes it more difficult to join accused infringers in patent
infringement cases and therefore increases costs for patent owners. To
make sense of the enactment of § 299, consider the incentives for
patent owners to join multiple accused infringers in one lawsuit:
Joinder reduces costs for patent owners, increases costs for accused
infringers, and facilitates forum shopping by patent owners. Also con-
sider the split of authority among district courts regarding the proper
interpretation of Rule 20 in patent infringement cases and the effect
of this split of authority on the filing practices of patent owners. As
discussed below, these factors likely motivated Congress and the
President to enact the joinder provision of the AIA.
A. Incentives for Patent Owners to Join Multiple Accused
Infringers in One Lawsuit
For the most part, patent owners determine which accused
infringers to involve in patent infringement cases.98 Various economic
and strategic incentives affect this decision. While conceptually these
incentives affect decisionmaking by any type of plaintiff, at least some
of these incentives hold unique importance in patent infringement liti-
gation. In addition, some of these incentives-namely, increasing the
costs borne by alleged infringers and forum shopping-perniciously
affect accused infringers.
98 In certain circumstances, accused infringers may file actions seeking declaratory
judgments of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability. See MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (summarizing the test for whether declaratory
judgment actions satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement as "whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
of a declaratory judgment" (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But declaratory judgment actions represent
"only a small percentage" of all cases involving allegations of patent infringement. Megan
M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 43, 45 (2010).
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1. Reducing Costs for Patent Owners
A patent owner, like any other plaintiff, can reduce its own costs
by naming multiple accused infringers in one case rather than bringing
separate actions, particularly if the separate cases would not otherwise
be consolidated. The patent owner benefits by paying only one filing
fee;99 creating economies of scale related to the processing and review
of documents produced by accused infringers; avoiding repetitive
defensive discovery and briefing; consolidating expert report prepara-
tion and discovery; and preparing and bringing fact and expert wit-
nesses to hearings and trials once rather than multiple times.
Beyond the general cost-reduction benefits of joining multiple
defendants in one case, joinder in patent infringement cases results in
a single claim construction hearing in which a judge receives briefing,
hears arguments, and ultimately interprets the patent document to
determine the scope of the invention covered by the patent-and,
therefore, the right granted by the patent.100 Joining multiple accused
infringers in one lawsuit allows this particularly onerous task to be
conducted only once, saving the patent owner time and effort.101
All told, from the perspective of a patent owner, efficiency gains
associated with joinder may be great. Moreover, for patent owners,
there are few apparent downsides associated with naming multiple
accused infringers in one lawsuit. 102 Thus, the reduction of costs pro-
vides an incentive for a patent owner to name multiple accused
infringers in one lawsuit. But the ability to name multiple accused
infringers in one lawsuit also creates the potential for abuse, including
unnecessarily increasing accused infringers' costs and enabling
extreme forms of forum shopping.
99 Congress currently requires a plaintiff to pay $350 to file an action in federal district
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006).
100 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996) (holding
that judges, rather than juries, construe the meaning of words in patent claims).
101 Joinder also eliminates the possibility of multiple claim construction hearings in front
of different judges, which could result in differing constructions and, ultimately, conflicting
judgments.
102 There are some incentives not to join multiple accused infringers in one lawsuit. One
is the ability to conduct a test case and develop helpful precedent quickly and for little cost
by targeting a single, underfunded, weak accused infringer. This strategy, however, would
not prevent a follow-on lawsuit naming multiple accused infringers. Furthermore, though
patent owners may not realize it, the more accused infringers named in one case, the less
likely that case is to settle. If the case does not settle, the patent owner is more likely to
lose, at least according to one recent empirical study. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 699-704 (2011). "[A]
plausible explanation ... is that when a patentee sues multiple defendants, the patentee
loses control over the case, being forced to trial or judgment even in cases it would prefer
to settle, and which it is more likely to lose." Id. at 703.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
672 [Vol. 88:652
PA TENT MISJOINDER
2. Increasing Costs for Accused Infringers
Litigation can be expensive, of course, for parties on both sides of
the "v." While joining multiple accused infringers in a single action
reduces a patent owner's costs, joinder may increase costs borne by
accused infringers. Indeed, increasing costs for accused infringers
cannot be ignored as a strategic reason for a patent owner to name
multiple accused infringers in one lawsuit. However, joinder can
increase some of the accused infringers' litigation costs while
decreasing others, which may complicate patent owners' strategic
calculus.
From the perspective of accused infringers, joinder can reduce lit-
igation expenses by allowing parties to share costs associated with
expensive tasks such as offensive discovery of the patent owner,
inventors, and third parties; the processing and review of documents
produced by the patent owner, inventors, and third parties; investiga-
tions into prior art; retaining and working with experts; and claim con-
struction and other common briefings and presentations.
Joinder, however, also creates costs unique to lawsuits involving
multiple accused infringers, exacerbates costs attendant to lawsuits
involving one accused infringer, and eliminates many individualized
opportunities for discovery and presentation of positions to the court
or jury. Indeed, as Magistrate Judge John Love of the Eastern District
of Texas recognized, "when multiple parties, multiple patents, mul-
tiple claims, and multiple accused products are involved, the costs and
complexities [of patent cases] will often increase exponentially."10 3
Joinder, for example, creates added incentives for each accused
infringer to monitor information and activities associated with other
accused infringers in an attempt to reduce or eliminate surprise and
prejudice caused by the revelation of bad facts or contrary positions at
a common hearing or trial. Moreover, joinder creates incentives
for-and, in some courts, requires-accused infringers to cooperate,
for example, to reduce the number of issues presented to the court,
the number of pages presented in briefing, the time required for hear-
ings and trial, and the substantive content of briefing, hearings, and
trial presentations. Joinder also reduces the otherwise available
103 John D. Love et al., Complex Patent Cases: Observations from the Bench, 13 SMU
Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 121, 121 (2010). Notably, Judge Love recognizes the increased costs
borne by patent owners and courts-not just accused infringers-in patent cases involving
multiple accused infringers. In light of these concerns, he provides suggestions regarding
case-management and discovery techniques to help courts and parties resolve their dis-
putes in a more efficient manner. See id. at 122-37. He does not address the antecedent
issue of joinder. See id.
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number of depositions permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, unless the parties agree to modify the default rule. 104
Particularly in patent infringement cases, parties joined in one
lawsuit may also confront problems associated with their competition
in the marketplace outside the lawsuit, such as disputes regarding the
scope and application of protective orders governing confidential
information. Such disputes reflect the simultaneous competing desires
both to shield confidential information from other accused infringers
so it is not used outside the lawsuit and to share the same information
with other accused infringers to coordinate positions in the lawsuit.
Other problems may exist for accused infringers. Collective
action problems may be present, including free-riding, lack of coordi-
nation, and lack of leadership.10 5 Undue prejudice may also result. For
example, if a patent owner accuses one defendant of willful infringe-
ment, it is at least conceivable that a jury's view of other accused
defendants may be tainted by such an allegation, perhaps due to a jury
confusing the parties.10 6 Joinder certainly eliminates independent
decisionmaking regarding discovery, briefing, and strategy related to
hearings and trial.
In any particular situation, a patent owner may see joinder as
imposing greater costs than benefits on accused infringers. Thus, in
certain circumstances the perception of net costs inflicted on accused
infringers may provide an incentive for patent owners to name mul-
tiple accused infringers in one lawsuit. This situation is particularly
troubling because of the possibility that patent owners asserting weak
104 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring leave of court for defendants as a
whole to take more than ten depositions). But cf FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (allowing each
party to serve on any other party up to twenty-five interrogatories); FED. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(1) (allowing each party to serve on any other party an unlimited number of requests
for admission).
105 These collective action problems, including free-riding, "undercut[] patent chal-
lenges" even outside the context of a lawsuit involving multiple accused infringers. See
Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the Patent-
Challenge-Bloc's Antitrust Status, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, at 3, http://stlr.stanford.edu/
pdf/miller-joint-defense.pdf (introducing the collective action problem plaguing any patent
challenge); see also Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards
for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 673-76 (2004) (describing the social
costs associated with reduced incentive for alleged infringers "to fight a patent case to the
finish" given the application of defensive nonmutual issue preclusion to a judgment of
invalidity, where "an alleged infringer who wins a patent invalidity judgment earns a ben-
efit not only for itself but for everyone, including those of this winner's competitors who
were either practicing the patented technology already or might wish to adopt it in the
future").
106 A district court may, at its discretion, grant up to treble damages after a jury finds
willful infringement. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994)).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 88:652674
PATENT MISJOINDER
claims of patent infringement may obtain leverage, increasing the
number of "strike suits"-cases that settle for less than the cost of
defense. Concern over the increase in strike suits may have played a
role in the enactment of the new statutory section governing joinder
of accused infringers in patent infringement litigation.
This ability to increase accused infringers' costs through joinder is
a concern that deserves particular attention in cases involving "non-
practicing entities" or "patent trolls." To the extent these entities seek
licensing revenues based on the high cost associated with defending
patent infringement litigation, they will have a natural tendency to
seek out opportunities to increase costs borne by accused infringers.
Thus, the enactment of § 299 may have been directed toward elimi-
nating the ability of patent trolls to join multiple accused infringers in
one lawsuit to increase the magnitude of strike-suit settlements.
3. Joining Accused Infringers as Anchors Supporting Venue
Patent owners may also join multiple accused infringers in one
lawsuit for venue and forum shopping purposes.107 Forum shopping,
of course, is a litigation strategy relevant to any type of litigation; its
potential to affect the outcome of a case is well documented.108 Within
patent litigation, however, forum shopping has received particular
attention both historically and more recently. In 1982, for example,
legislators pointed to forum shopping among the various regional
appellate courts as a reason to create the Federal Circuit and vest it
with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases with claims arising
under the patent laws.109
More significant for purposes of a modern analysis of permissive
joinder, however, is the recent attention the Federal Circuit has given
to forum shopping among various federal district courts and, in
107 This third incentive is not necessarily mutually exclusive of the first two incentives.
For example, naming multiple accused infringers to anchor a lawsuit in a particular forum
may create or exacerbate costs for accused infringers by preventing transfer of the case to a
forum more convenient to that accused infringer.
108 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511-12, app. at 1534-35 (1995) (indicating that,
in a study of over three million federal cases, plaintiffs' win rate drops from 58% in
non-transferred cases to 29% in transferred cases and that, in a study of over 13,000 patent
cases, the plaintiffs' win rate drops from 65% to 51% after transfer).
109 See George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
671, 705 (2011) (arguing that the consensus of evidence shows that Congress created the
Federal Circuit in order "to create a court with subject matter jurisdiction over national
issues that would promote uniformity of patent law, eliminate forum shopping in patent
cases, and thereby increase and promote technological innovation in the United States").
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particular, in the Eastern District of Texas.110 Empirical evidence
demonstrates that the Eastern District of Texas transferred patent
cases as often or more often than federal courts both on a national
scale and as compared to other high-volume patent litigation dis-
tricts."' Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has focused on the perceived
inability of accused infringers to escape the Eastern District of Texas.
Indeed, since the end of 2008 the Federal Circuit has issued nine writs
of mandamus ordering the Eastern District of Texas to transfer patent
infringement cases to more convenient forums1 12 and one additional
writ of mandamus ordering the Eastern District of Texas to reconsider
denial of a motion to transfer a patent infringement case to an alleg-
edly more convenient forum.'13
In response to these transfer orders,114 a patent owner may name
certain accused infringers in a patent infringement lawsuit in an effort
to reduce the likelihood that claims against other accused infringers
will be transferred to forums more convenient to the other accused
110 This Article focuses on the Eastern District of Texas given (1) the high volume of
writs of mandamus ordering that court to transfer cases to more convenient forums and (2)
the focus on the Eastern District of Texas in the legislative history of the AIA. The Federal
Circuit, however, has also recently ordered the District of Delaware to transfer a case to a
more convenient forum. See In re LinkAMedia Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1225 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (ordering transfer to the Northern District of California). The Federal Circuit
held that the fact that a defendant is incorporated in a forum does not, alone, make
transfer to an allegedly more convenient forum improper. Id. at 1223-24.
111 See Paul M. Janicke, Patent Venue and Convenience Transfer: New World or Small
Shift?, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 19-22 (2009), http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/
files/Janicke.pdf (showing a higher patent transfer rate in the Eastern District of Texas
compared to rates nationally and in high-volume district courts). On the other hand, the
Eastern District of Texas has granted motions to transfer in patent cases less often than
other courts. See id. at 22-23; see also lancu & Chung, supra note 31, at 314 ("[Tjhe
Eastern District of Texas has historically had among the lowest venue-transfer win rates.").
112 In re Morgan Stanley, 417 F. App'x 947, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Verizon Bus.
Network Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559, 562 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d
1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In
re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nintendo Co., 589
F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech
USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
113 In re Oracle Corp., 399 F. App'x 587, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
114 The Federal Circuit issued these opinions relatively soon after the Fifth Circuit, in an
en banc opinion, clarified its law governing motions to transfer to more convenient forums.
See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The Federal
Circuit applied Fifth Circuit law in these cases because the Eastern District of Texas sits in
the Fifth Circuit, and the question of the appropriateness of transfer to a more convenient
forum does not involve substantive issues of patent law. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551
F.3d at 1319. The Federal Circuit's focus on transfer for reasons of convenience, however,
is not limited to cases involving the Eastern District of Texas. See, e.g., In re
LinkAMedia Devices Corp., 662 F.3d at 1225 (ordering the District of Delaware to
transfer a patent infringement case based on relative convenience).
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infringers.115 For example, if a patent owner names a number of
accused infringers in a complaint filed in the Eastern District of Texas,
where at least one of the accused infringers is headquartered in or
near the Eastern District of Texas or has significant ties to that district,
the patent owner may be able to avoid transfer.116 Accused infringers
with ties to a forum may therefore serve as anchors during a transfer
analysis, creating an incentive for patent owners to name as co-
defendants accused infringers with ties to the Eastern District of
Texas, for example, along with accused infringers without such ties."17
115 This situation is analogous to a plaintiff naming a non-diverse defendant in a com-
plaint filed in state court to prevent removal to federal court based on lack of complete
diversity. The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of fraudulent joinder to address this
strategy. See, e.g., Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 179-86 (1907)
(affirming refusal to remand a case because the lower court did not err in finding that the
real purpose in joining a non-diverse defendant was to prevent the exercise of the right to
removal by a diverse defendant); Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 217
(1906) (stating that "the right to remove depended upon the case made in the complaint
against both defendants jointly, and that right in the absence of a showing of fraudulent
joinder, did not arise from the failure of the complainant to establish a joint cause of
action" (emphasis added)). Pursuant to this doctrine, federal district courts may assume
jurisdiction over cases meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement despite the absence
of complete diversity between adverse parties when there is no possibility of recovery
against non-diverse defendants in state court. See Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and
Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119, 133-34 (2006) (describing ways a
removing defendant may show fraudulent joinder).
116 See, e.g., In re Google Inc., 412 F. App'x 295 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (denying petition for
writ of mandamus to order the Eastern District of Texas to transfer the entire action, or to
sever and transfer the petitioner's claims, to the Northern District of California because
four defendants were headquartered in the Eastern District of Texas, despite the district
court's acknowledgement that the Northern District of California would have been more
convenient for the seven defendants residing there). The strategy of naming local defen-
dants in addition to non-local defendants, however, is not always successful. See, e.g., LG
Elecs. Inc. v. First Int'l Computer, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582-93 (D.N.J. 2001) (severing
claims among defendants, transferring claims against foreign defendants, and staying
claims against local "peripheral" defendant); Gold v. Burton Co., 949 F. Supp. 208, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (severing and transferring the main proceeding because the plaintiff
"joined an alleged infringer who has no real connection with the case except being down-
stream of the real defendant in the distribution chain for the manifest purpose of insisting
upon an inconvenient venue with which the plaintiff himself has no genuine tie"); see also
Shifferaw v. Emson USA, No. 2:09-CV-54-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 1064380, at *1, *6 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 18, 2010) (ordering severance and transfer despite joinder of local defendant);
Calmedica, LLC v. Novoste Corp., No. 03-C-3924, 2004 WL 413296, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
30, 2004) (same). Moreover, transparent attempts to game the system may abuse local
businesses and generate negative publicity. See, e.g., Zusha Elinson, IP Forum Shoppers:
Any Excuse for Texas, THE RECORDER, July 23, 2009, available at LEXIS Legal News
Library (describing small businesses in the Eastern District of Texas as "absurd pawns in
the patent litigation venue-shopping game").
117 Members of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee considered the appropriate-
ness of venue as a legitimate part of a joinder analysis. When considering permissive
joinder, the committee noted that a prior English rule excluded actions for the recovery of
land, possibly because of concerns regarding venue and a theory that such actions must be
tried near the land in question. NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 478.
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By reducing the likelihood of transfer by joining accused
infringers with ties to the forum, the patent owner may reduce its own
costs and increase costs borne by accused infringers. The patent owner
may also bolster its negotiating position by utilizing a forum more
favorable to it in particular and perhaps, more generally, favorable to
patent owners as a class of litigants. 18 Congress and the President
may have viewed the joinder provision in the AIA as a way to combat
this forum-shopping strategy.
B. Identifying Misjoinder: The Split of Authority
Another significant consideration with respect to reasons for
enactment of § 299 is the prior disparate treatment of Rule 20 in
patent infringement cases among various district courts and, indeed,
among judges within the Eastern District of Texas.119
1. MyMail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc. and Its Progeny
On one end of the spectrum lie decisions that allowed practically
unlimited joinder of accused infringers. The leading opinion on this
Rule 20 by its terms applies to joinder of "[plersons-as well as a vessel, cargo, or other
property subject to admiralty process in rem" and therefore, like its English predecessor,
does not apply to actions for the recovery of land. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
118 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 916-23 (2001) (analyzing whether patent holder
win rates vary by district and concluding that "[p]atent holders have a significantly higher
win rate when they file suit and thereby choose the forum").
119 Parties have litigated the question of the appropriateness of joinder of accused
infringers in many patent infringement cases in the last few years. But this question is not
unique to patent infringement cases-for example, it has been a frequent question in cases
relating to alleged improper use of television transmissions. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Barrett, 220 F.R.D. 630, 632 (D. Kan. 2004) (denying motion to sever for misjoinder after
recognizing that "numerous district courts across the nation have ordered severance of
claims in DIRECTV cases. . . . But other courts have also declined to sever the claims");
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hosey, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (denying motion for
severance for misjoinder because it would serve "no useful purpose" given the likelihood
that the cases would be consolidated for discovery purposes); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Perez,
No. 03-C-3504, 2003 WL 22682344, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2003) (finding misjoinder even
though the "transactions are logically related to one another in the same way that
purchases of milk from the grocery store are logically related to one another: each transac-
tion involves a transaction in a similar good for a similar purpose" because "[b]eyond that,
the similarities end"); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. 639, 642-44 (S.D. Iowa
2003) (granting motion to sever in the absence of a "transactional link" other than the
allegation that all defendants violated the same statutes); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Armellino,
216 F.R.D. 240, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing claims against all but one defendant
because the claims "turn on the fact-specific question of whether each defendant inter-
cepted DIRECTV's broadcasts" and because "DIRECTV does not plead any facts which
indicate that there is any connection whatsoever among the various defendants"). What is
unique is the response: repealing Rule 20 in most patent infringement lawsuits and
replacing it with a statutory section placing new limitations on permissive joinder of par-
ties. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012).
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end of the spectrum is MyMail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc., authored
by Judge Leonard Davis of the Eastern District of Texas.120 In this
case, the court rejected the accused infringers' request "to follow a
handful of district court cases that purportedly hold [that] acts of
infringement by separate defendants do not satisfy the same transac-
tion requirement." 12 1 Instead, the court relied upon the logical rela-
tionship test and, in particular, an interpretation of that test requiring
"some nucleus of operative facts or law." 122 The court focused on the
goals of Rule 20123 and ultimately stated that "[i]t is possible that sev-
erance could be appropriate if the [accused infringers'] methods or
products were dramatically different."1 24 Based on this focus on
whether the methods or products were "dramatically different," the
court maintained that its holding was "not incompatible" with the
holding of other cases from other districts.125 It decided it was not in a
120 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004). Notably, the question of misjoinder of accused
infringers in patent infringement cases has been litigated since at least the nineteenth cen-
tury. See, e.g., Consol. Car-Heating Co. v. W. End St. Ry. Co., 85 F. 662, 663 (1st Cir. 1898)
(rejecting claim of misjoinder of accused infringers when the patent owner alleged con-
spiracy and joint infringement and the court dismissed all claims against accused infringers
other than the appellant).
121 MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 456 n.1 (citing Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec
Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415 (D. Del. 2004); Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 122
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
N.J. Mach. Inc. v. Alford Indus. Inc., No. 89-1879 (JCL), 1991 WL 340196 (D.N.J. Oct. 7,
1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983)). The court
rejected the position that infringement by different defendants does not satisfy Rule 20's
"same transaction" requirement, finding this interpretation to be "a hypertechnical one
that perhaps fails to recognize the realities of complex, and particularly patent, litigation."
MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 457. The court explained: "In essence, the [defendants] advo-
cate a rule that requires separate proceedings simply because unrelated defendants are
alleged to have infringed the same patent. The Court disagrees with such a per se rule that
elevates form over substance." Id. This characterization of the defendants' position seems
to ignore or at least downplay the fact that severance does not necessarily require separate
proceedings in light of the ability to consolidate cases for pretrial purposes pursuant to
Rule 42 or the Multidistrict Litigation Panel and, at least before the enactment of the AIA,
for trial pursuant to Rule 42. See infra Part IV.D.
122 MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 456 (citing Hanley v. First Investors Corp., 151 F.R.D.
76, 79 (E.D. Tex. 1993)). While the court cited Hanley for support, that decision analyzed
permissive joinder of plaintiffs rather than defendants. Hanley, 151 F.R.D. at 77.
123 See MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 457 ("Such an interpretation does not further the
goals of Rule 20, especially for discovery and motion purposes."). This analysis appears to
recognize some but not all of the competing policies advocated by members of the
Advisory Committee during their deliberations over Rule 20. See supra Part I.A.2 (ana-
lyzing competing objectives and policies of the Advisory Committee, including members
who favored restraints on joinder).
124 MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 457.
125 Id. The court explained that some prior opinions do not indicate whether the alleged
acts of infringement are "different" because they are separate acts or because they are
dissimilar. It explained that one prior opinion focuses on dissimilarity of products and, to a
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position to determine whether the accused methods or products were
dramatically different because fact discovery was not complete.126 The
court also refused to exercise its discretion under Rule 21 to sever the
parties based on its view that "[t]he joinder rules were created to
increase judicial efficiency" and its conclusion that severance would
"decrease judicial efficiency by requiring duplicitous claim construc-
tions, discovery, and pretrial motions." 127
Three aspects of the MyMail opinion deserve examination. First,
consider the substantive standard the court articulates. By interpreting
the "same transaction" requirement as allowing joinder of parties
when there is a "nucleus of operative facts or law,"128 the court effec-
tively joins the first and second requirements of Rule 20 (the "transac-
tion" and the "common question of fact or law" requirements) into
one test. The test the court applies, however, turns on its interpreta-
tion of a "nucleus of operative facts or law" in the context of a patent
infringement lawsuit. In particular, the court allows joinder of parties
so long as the products or methods of the accused infringers are not
"dramatically different." This is a very liberal test for the appropriate-
ness of joinder of accused infringers. That is, for the court to find mis-
joinder, it must find dramatic differences, not just differences. Note
too that this analysis focuses on the accused infringers' products and
methods, not the concept that the accused infringers allegedly infringe
the same patent.129
lesser extent, whether the alleged infringers' acts were connected. It distinguished another
case because the decision to sever the case was made after discovery was complete. It
further explained that one prior opinion adopts a per se rule that unrelated defendants
require separate proceedings. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 457-58.
128 Id. at 456.
129 An alternative way to analyze joinder of accused infringers under Rule 20 is to focus
on the fact that each allegation of infringement arises with respect to the issuance of a
particular patent, where the patent's issuance by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
qualifies as "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences."
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). All of the cases analyzing permissive joinder of parties in patent
infringement litigation, however, focus on the alleged acts of infringement, rather than the
act of patent issuance; this is probably appropriate. In this regard, a patent is like a criminal
statute, where the claims of the patent define the elements required to be proven to con-
clude that a "crime" of infringement occurred. It seems unlikely that a court would allow
the government to prosecute every person alleged of violating a particular criminal statute
in one case. Indeed, the Advisory Committee collectively scoffed at the notion that the
government could sue every delinquent taxpayer in the same lawsuit. NOVEMBER 1935
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 466. The question of infringement of the patent claim can
be viewed as a common question of fact, and the question of the validity of the patent
claim involves a common question of fact (for example, anticipation) and law (for example,
obviousness). A common question, however, is insufficient for joinder of parties given the
same transaction requirement.
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Second, consider the procedural mechanism the MyMail court
adopted for determining the appropriateness of joinder. It required
the party alleging misjoinder to prove that the accused products or
methods were "dramatically different" based on evidence, not allega-
tion.130 By doing so, it effectively produced two presumptions, only
one of which was rebuttable. First, it created an irrebuttable presump-
tion that joinder of accused infringers through the end of discovery
was appropriate. Second, it created a presumption that joinder of
accused infringers through trial was appropriate. This second pre-
sumption was rebuttable, but not until fact discovery was complete.
Thus, accused infringers would remain joined in lawsuits until the
close of fact discovery-after the patent owner had been afforded
opportunities to develop its own evidence that the accused methods or
products were not dramatically different.13' Of course, many accused
infringers might settle by that time. Furthermore, once fact discovery
is complete, many bases for severance-for example, inefficiencies
and prejudice from joinder-may no longer exist. Moreover, requiring
joinder to turn on evidentiary considerations turns the analysis away
from the sufficiency of allegations in the complaint. Given the timing
of the analysis, the joinder determination would focus largely on sev-
erance for trial rather than severance for any other purpose, such as
individualized discovery or convenient discovery.
Third, consider the MyMail court's justification for its holding:
judicial efficiency. The court adopted a liberal standard for its analysis
of permissive joinder of accused infringers based almost exclusively on
preferred policy considerations rather than on a textual analysis of
Rule 20. The court telegraphed as much when it referenced, but did
not list, the "goals" of Rule 20 and concluded that "the record before
the Court does not show that the products or methods at issue are so
different that determining infringement in one case is less proper or
efficient than determining infringement in multiple cases."132 The lib-
eral nature of this standard was consistent with some of the Advisory
Committee members' views of permissive joinder, 33 and its basis was
consistent with Professor Kane's view that policy considerations
130 MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 457.
131 The court's articulation of the standard it applies, at least facially, does not turn on
the fact that the accused infringers allegedly infringe the same patent. The reality, however,
is that the simple allegation of infringement of the same patent creates the irrebuttable
presumption that joinder through the end of discovery is appropriate and the rebuttable
presumption that joinder through trial is appropriate.
132 Id.
133 See supra notes 44, 47 and accompanying text (addressing goals of Advisory
Committee members who sought to liberalize joinder).
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should dictate the application of Rule 20 in any particular case.134 But
this justification did not take into account other Advisory Committee
members' concerns regarding costs and prejudices levied upon defen-
dants. 135 Moreover, the MyMail court did not evaluate inefficiencies
associated with joinder generally or with patent infringement cases
particularly, nor did it consider costs connected with forum
shopping.136
Opinions issued by the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern
District of Texas, the District of Kansas, and the Eastern District of
Louisiana cited MyMail and its progeny approvingly and found
joinder appropriate in patent infringement cases.137 Moreover, opin-
ions outside the context of patent infringement litigation both in the
Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere also cited MyMail and relied
on it to analyze the question of permissive joinder of parties.138 Still
other courts reached similar conclusions regarding joinder without
citing MyMail.139 All of these cases reflect the position advocated by
Judge Clark after the Advisory Committee's deliberations concerning
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: that joinder of parties effec-
tively should not be restricted based on the same transaction
requirement.140
134 See Kane, supra note 12, at 1747 ("It is possible to arrive at an appropriate definition
in a given case only by considering whether the proposed scope of a transaction will meet
the objectives and policies underlying the standard that is involved.").
135 See supra notes 45, 47 and accompanying text (addressing goals of Advisory
Committee members who sought to place restraints on joinder).
136 See supra Parts II.A.2-3 (analyzing inefficiencies and forum shopping related to
joinder practices by patent owners).
137 See, e.g., Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2010 WL 3835762,
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010) (citing MyMail and denying severance); Alford Safety
Servs., Inc. v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233, at *9-10 (E.D. La. Aug. 24,
2010) (same); Mannatech, Inc. v. Country Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL
2944574, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) (denying severance and citing Adrain v. Genetec
Inc., No. 2:08-CV-423, 2009 WL 3063414, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009)); Adrain, 2009
WL 3063414, at *2-3 (citing MyMail and denying severance); Centre One v. Vonage
Holdings Corp., No. 6:08CV467, 2009 WL 2461003, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (same);
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 617-18 (D. Kan. 2006)
(same).
138 See, e.g., DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank v. All Gen. Lines
Ins., LLC, No. 10-02126-JAR-JPO, 2010 WL 4683583, at *6 nn.31, 36 (D. Kan. Nov. 10,
2010) (opinion in loan enforcement case citing MyMail); Coll v. Abaco Operating LLC,
No. 2:08-CV-345 (TJW), 2009 WL 2857821, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2009) (opinion in oil
and gas case citing MyMail); In re Elrod Holdings Corp., 385 B.R. 806, 812 (Bankr. D. Del.
2008) (opinion in bankruptcy case citing MyMail).
139 See, e.g., SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., No. 04-1199-SLR, 2005 WL 851126,
at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2005) (denying motion to sever when "all of the patents asserted
arise out of computer network protection systems" and noting that "patents over the same
technology often give rise to the same questions of law and fact").
140 Professor Bone describes Judge Clark's views during the deliberations as follows:
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2. Opinions Restricting Joinder of Accused Infringers
On the other end of the spectrum lie cases that limited joinder of
accused infringers. These opinions adopted various interpretations of
Rule 20, but ultimately applied those interpretations to restrict joinder
of accused infringers.141 One example is WiAV Networks, LLC v.
3Com Corp.1 4 2 In this case, Judge William Alsup of the Northern
Charles Clark and James Moore, Clark's research assistant-the two persons
most responsible for drafting the federal joinder rules . . . downplayed the
practical significance of Rule 20(a)'s commonality requirements. For example,
Judge Clark noted that the Advisory Committee would probably not have
objected to unlimited party joinder and that the commonality restrictions made
no practical difference because Rule 20(a) was broad enough to allow joinder
"in any case where anybody would ever think of joinder."
Bone, supra note 56, at 105 (quoting Charles E. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by
the New Federal Rules 1, 15 TENN. L. REV. 551, 569 (1939)); see also RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 261 (William W. Dawson
ed. 1938) ("[T]he test which has come to be called the 'common question of law or fact
test' has been adopted and is stated in these rules.... I think this is the most important
part of the test-'if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the
action.'"); Charles E. Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 TEX.
L. REV. 4, 8-9 (1941) (stating "dogmatically that the joinder rules are very good" while
criticizing a Texas counterclaim rule that, like Rule 20, turned on identifying claims
"'arising out of the same transaction,' . . . which led to so much useless litigation"). The
Advisory Committee's deliberations fairly demonstrate that Judge Clark was incorrect in
asserting that the committee would not have objected to unlimited joinder of parties.
NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 461-515.
141 See, e.g., Joao Control & Monitoring Sys. of Cal. v. ACTI Corp., No. SA CV 10-
01909 DOC, 2011 WL 1519277, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011) ("In patent infringement
cases against multiple infringers of the same patent, the 'same transaction' test is met when
the multiple alleged infringers acted in concert with each other when they produced, sold,
or distributed the same allegedly infringing device."); Rudd v. LUX Prods. Corp., No. 09-
cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (granting motion to sever
because unrelated defendants, based on different acts, were alleged to have infringed the
same patent); Spread Spectrum Screening, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 10 C 1101,
2010 WL 3516106, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2010) ("[J]oinder is often improper where two
competing businesses have allegedly infringed the same patent by selling different prod-
ucts."); Reid v. Gen. Motors Corp., 240 F.R.D. 260, 263 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (indicating that
allegations of infringement against unrelated parties based on different acts do not arise
from the same transaction); Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("[T]he fact that two parties may manufacture or sell similar products, and that these
sales or production may have infringed the identical patent owned by the plaintiffs is not
sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pursuant to Rule
20(a)."); N.J. Mach., Inc. v. Alford Indus., Inc., No. 89-1879 (JCL), 1991 WL 340196, at *1
(D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) ("Infringement of the same patent by different machines and parties
does not constitute the same transaction or occurrence to justify joinder of the new defen-
dants."), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1371 (D. Del. 1983)
("Allegations of infringement against two unrelated parties based on different acts do not
arise from the same transaction.")
142 No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010). Interestingly, the
Eastern District of Texas transferred this case to the Northern District of California.
Id. at *1.
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District of California issued a show cause order questioning whether
the plaintiff-patent owner had misjoined accused infringers by naming
sixty-eight defendants, forty of whom remained in the case at the time
of the resolution of the show cause order.143 The court noted that "the
vast majority [of the accused infringers] . . . are wholly unrelated com-
panies with wholly unrelated products," highlighted the absence of
any allegation of concerted action to infringe any of the patents-in-
suit, and concluded that the accused infringers shared no common
transaction or occurrence.144
The court recognized the patent owner's "bone-crushing burden
of individualized methods of proof unique to each product," focused
attention on the absence of either a conspiracy claim or an allegation
that one defendant induced another to infringe, and observed that
"[e]ach defendant has simply been thrown into a mass pit with others
to suit plaintiff's convenience."1 4 5 It recognized that accused infringers
"will surely have competing interests and strategies" and "are also
entitled to present individualized assaults on questions of non-
infringement, invalidity, and claim construction."14 6
The WiAV court rejected the argument that adherence to a
common protocol constitutes a "logical[ ] connect[ion]" sufficient for
joinder because, "[e]ven if each of the accused devices is compliant
with the . . . protocol, it is far from a foregone conclusion that the
asserted claims in [the plaintiff's] patents will cover all implementa-
tions of the protocol."147 Indeed, the patent owner conceded that
"there would be slight differences in hardware and software compo-
nents involved" and did not show "that practicing the asserted patents
is essential to complying with the protocol in all instances."148 The
court concluded that the "plaintiff cannot escape the fact that it is
suing unrelated and competing defendants for their own independent
acts of patent infringement."1 49
The WiAV court stated that other decisions cited by the plaintiff
addressing permissive joinder, including MyMail,o50 "avoid[ ]the ques-
tion of how the infringing conduct of different defendants with dif-
ferent products, acting separately, can involve or arise out of 'the same
143 Id. at *1.
144 Id.
145 Id. at *2.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149 Id. at *3.
150 Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Auths. in Response to the Court's Order to
Show Cause at 6, WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL
3895047 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010).
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transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.' 151
While the WiA V court conceded that, as discussed in MyMail, "some
claim construction issues will overlap,"it rejected the position that
joinder was appropriate to consolidate claim construction in one court
because "claim-construction work must be adapted to the actual issues
being litigated over the varying accused devices."1 52 In the end, the
court suggested that any efficiencies gained from joinder would be
outweighed by the concomitant inefficiencies: "In short, whatever
common issues may exist from device to device will be overwhelmed
by the individual issues of claim construction, damages, willfulness,
and discovery supervision." 5 3
The opinion in WiAV is as notable as the decision in MyMail, and
not just because of the striking difference in tone and result. The
WiAV opinion set forth a different substantive standard, described a
contrary procedural mechanism, and articulated different policy con-
siderations. First, consider the substantive standard. The court repeat-
edly focused on whether the patent owner had named defendants that
were related companies with related products, acting in concert with
respect to the alleged infringement. And it effectively required that no
differences-as opposed to the no dramatic differences test of
MyMail' 54-exist among accused products for joinder to be proper.
Second, consider the procedural mechanism for resolving the
question of misjoinder. The court resolved the question early in the
case, using a show cause order, long before the close of fact discovery.
Perhaps because of this timing, the court focused on claims and allega-
tions rather than requiring evidence proving these claims and
allegations.
Third, note the host of policy considerations identified in the
WiAV opinion. The court did not focus exclusively on the plaintiff's
convenience. It referenced preservation of the accused infringers'
"entitlement" to present individualized defenses and claim construc-
tion positions. It rejected a policy-based argument that consolidated
claim construction proceedings would be efficient. It also weighed
efficiencies associated with common issues against inefficiencies
caused by individual issues. The court ultimately concluded that the
benefit from adjudicating common issues together would be
151 WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)).
152 Id. ("[D]ifferences in the products themselves will provoke differences in which
words and slants in the claim language really matter [to defendants].").
153 Id.
154 MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 457 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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overwhelmed by the individual issues, given the nature of the infringe-
ment allegations and the accused infringers.
Beyond WiAV, there are many cases that found misjoinder of
accused infringers or refused to allow joinder of accused infringers.
Like WiAV, some courts found misjoinder when accused products
were merely different,155 a lower threshold than the "dramatically dif-
ferent" standard of MyMail. Some courts refused to allow joinder of
unrelated accused infringers even if their products were similar1 56 or
nearly identical.' 57 For these courts, any difference was enough to pre-
vent joinder. For example, in Rudd v. LUX Prods. Corp.,158 the
Northern District of Illinois rejected the argument that joinder was
proper even though the accused products "operate[d] in a nearly iden-
tical manner as it relates to the asserted patents" and the defendants'
affirmative defenses and counterclaims were "nearly identical."159
Some courts required a connection between the accused
infringers to permit joinder.160 Indeed, some courts identified cooper-
ation, concerted action, or collusion as necessary elements for
155 See, e.g., ThurmaPure, Inc. v. Temp-Air, Inc., No. 10-cv-4724, 2010 WL 5419090, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2010) ("[T]he fact that the defendants manufacture, sell, and market
different products and methods weighs against joinder."); Children's Network, LLC v.
Pixfusion LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Joinder of unrelated parties
into one action is generally inappropriate where, as here, the infringement of the same
patent is alleged, but the products are different."); N.J. Mach., Inc. v. Alford Indus., Inc.,
No. 89-1879 (JCL), 1991 WL 340196, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) ("Infringement of the
same patent by different machines and parties does not constitute the same transaction or
occurrence to justify joinder of the new defendants."), affd, 983 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564
F. Supp. 1358, 1371 (D. Del. 1983) ("Allegations of infringement against two unrelated
parties based on different acts do not arise from the same transaction.").
156 See, e.g., Rudd v. LUX Prods. Corp., No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) ("Simply alleging that Defendants manufacture or sell similar products
does not support joinder under Rule 20."); Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 122,
128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he fact that two parties may manufacture or sell similar products,
and that these sales or production may have infringed the identical patent owned by the
plaintiffs is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pur-
suant to Rule 20(a).").
157 See Rudd, 2011 WL 148052, at *2 (rejecting the argument that the "transaction or
occurrence" prong of Rule 20 is met when "accused [products] operate in a nearly identical
manner as it relates to the asserted patents").
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415, 416-18 (D.
Del. 2004) (while the plaintiff argued that the two defendants' products "function identi-
cally for purposes of an infringement analysis," the court did not analyze the purported
similarity between the products and instead rejected joinder because "the only connection
between [the two defendants] is that they may have infringed the same patents ... which is
an insufficient basis to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit"); Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 564 F. Supp. at 1371 (rejecting joinder because "there is no
allegation that the acts of infringement are connected in any manner").
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joinder. 161 Another district court's opinion focused on whether there
was a reasonable inference of a common scheme of infringement. 162
But many courts required both (1) cooperation, concerted activity,
collusion, or a common scheme of infringement and (2) the absence of
differences among the accused methods or products.163
Many of these opinions expressly rejected the holding of MyMail.
For example, the Rudd court stated that MyMail "eviscerates the
same transaction or occurrence requirement and makes it indistin-
guishable from the requirement that there be a common question of
law or fact." 164 The Rudd court further stated its view that "MyMail's
approach is in the minority" and that numerous courts have concluded
that a party fails to satisfy the transaction requirement "where unre-
lated defendants, based on different acts, are alleged to have infringed
the same patent." 165
Outside the context of patent infringement litigation, various
courts have imposed similar restrictions on the ability to join multiple
parties in one case. Consider copyright infringement lawsuits and
161 See, e.g., Joao Control & Monitoring Sys. of Cal. v. ACTI Corp., No. SA CV 10-
01909 DOC, 2011 WL 1519277, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011) ("In patent infringement
cases against multiple infringers of the same patent, the 'same transaction' test is met when
the multiple alleged infringers acted in concert with each other when they produced, sold,
or distributed the same allegedly infringing device."); Pergo, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d at 128
("[T]here are no allegations of any cooperative or collusive relationship between the two
sets of defendants.").
162 Naschem Co. v. Blackswamp Trading Co., No. 08-cv-730-slc, 2009 WL 1307865, at *3
(W.D. Wis. May 8, 2009) (finding misjoinder and transferring claims against one accused
infringer based on lack of evidence allowing a reasonable inference of "common scheme of
infringement that would make joinder of their claims proper under Rule 20").
163 See, e.g., Joao Control & Monitoring Sys. of Cal., 2011 WL 1519277, at *1 ("In patent
infringement cases against multiple infringers of the same patent, the 'same transaction'
test is met when the multiple alleged infringers acted in concert with each other when they
produced, sold, or distributed the same allegedly infringing device."); Sorenson v. DMS
Holdings, Inc., No. 08cv559-BTM-CAB, 2010 WL 4909615, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010)
("[Ailleging a common manufacturer and infringement of the same patent is not enough to
support joinder where defendants are unrelated companies, selling different products.");
WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (rejecting argument that compliance with a protocol by the
accused infringers was insufficient to justify joinder because "there would be slight differ-
ences in hardware and software components involved" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
164 Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp., No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12,
2011) (quoting Reply Brief in Support of Emerson Electric Co.'s Motion to Dismiss for
Improper Joinder or, in the Alternative, to Sever and Transfer at 4) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
165 Id. at *3. This view is disputed. See Alford Safety Servs., Inc. v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No.
10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010) ("While some courts do hold
th[e] view [that acts of infringement by separate defendants do not satisfy the same
transaction requirement], the majority hold the view that joinder is proper in patent
infringement suits [when alleged infringement is based on the same patents].").
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trademark infringement lawsuits. In several cases, courts have
rejected attempts by record companies to name multiple users of file-
sharing websites as defendants in single actions alleging copyright
infringement because the record companies have not accused the
alleged infringers of conspiring or acting jointly.166 Similarly, courts
have denied joinder of multiple accused infringers in trademark cases
when trademark owners name unrelated parties and do not allege
concerted action.167 And the Second Circuit generally appears to
require an allegation of concerted action before it will permit joinder
of defendants in any type of case.168
The divergent interpretations and applications of Rule 20 both
inside and outside the context of patent infringement litigation should
not be surprising. They reflect the Advisory Committee's recognition
of the difficulty in interpreting the text of Rule 20.169 They also reflect
the competing policies advanced during the Advisory Committee's
deliberations.170 To the extent that many courts have used the same
transaction or occurrence requirement to limit joinder, however, they
tend to disprove Judge Clark's prediction that the common question
166 See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-4, 589 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding joinder improper); Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11, No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008
WL 4823160, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008) (finding joinder improper and collecting addi-
tional cases). Judge Kathleen O'Malley, who authored the opinion for the Northern
District of Ohio case, has since become a judge on the Federal Circuit.
167 See Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar & Grill, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285 (D.
Ariz. 2009) (rejecting joinder because "the claims alleged against [one defendant] are pre-
mised upon its own independent acts of infringement, unfair competition, and dilution that
are separate and distinct from the allegedly improper acts of any of the other defendants");
Colt Def. LLC v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 2:04cv258, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690,
at *16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2004) (holding that claims did not arise from the same transaction
or occurrence where separate defendants had each independently infringed the same
trademark); SB Designs v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 305 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
("The fact that the defendants allegedly violated the same trademark does not mean that
plaintiffs' claims against them arise out of the same transaction or occurrence."); see also
ThurmaPure, Inc. v. Temp-Air, Inc., No. 10-cv-4724, 2010 WL 5419090, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 22, 2010) (noting a long line of cases holding that "Rule 20(a)'s requirement for a
common transaction or occurrence is not satisfied where multiple defendants are merely
alleged to have infringed the same patent or trademark").
168 See Nassau Cnty. Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151,
1154 (2d Cir. 1974) ("No allegation of conspiracy or other concert of action has been
asserted."). At least one district court has interpreted Second Circuit law as requiring an
allegation of joint action. See Movie Sys., Inc. v. Abel, 99 F.R.D. 129, 130 (D. Minn. 1983)
("An allegation of joint action is required.").
169 See NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 487, 512-a (noting ambiguity in
the meaning of the phrase "a common question of law or fact arising out of a transaction or
series of transactions").
170 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (describing the competing policies
motivating members of the Advisory Committee).
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of law or fact requirement would be the only substantial limitation on
joinder of parties.171
These divergent interpretations and applications of Rule 20 in the
context of patent infringement litigation also explain why Congress
and the President sought to modify the rule governing joinder of
accused infringers. Splits of authority create uncertainty for litigants,
engender costly motion practice, and reduce the likelihood of out-of-
court resolution of disputes related to procedure. Indeed, the legisla-
tive history of the AIA repeatedly points toward this particular split of
authority as a reason for Congress to pass the AIA.172
C. The Trend Toward Increased Joinder of Accused Infringers in
Patent Infringement Litigation
When enacting § 299, the President and Congress may have been
concerned about the growing number of accused infringers joined in
patent infringement lawsuits. At least one prominent figure in the
patent law community identified this trend as a significant problem.
At a gathering of lawyers from the Eastern District of Texas just after
passage of the AIA, Randall Rader, Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit, commented on a "trend towards an excess number of parties
[that] unnecessarily multiplies the complexity of already-complex
litigation."173
Significantly, Chief Judge Rader did not cite any empirical sup-
port for this trend, and academic literatue to date has not identified
any evidence documenting the number of parties in patent infringe-
ment litigation. Therefore, I conducted an empirical study of two
forums, the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of Texas and
171 See McFarland, supra note 56, at 260, 261 n.68 (discussing Judge Clark's view of Rule
20). Given that the AIA limits joinder even further based on the "same transaction or
occurrence" requirement, the AIA represents a rejection of Judge Clark's normative argu-
ments in favor of a test for joinder that does not use the "same transaction or occurrence"
requirement.
172 See infra notes 223, 225 and accompanying text (analyzing the relevant legislative
history of the AIA). When the Federal Circuit-after passage of the AIA-resolved this
split of authority regarding Rule 20, it held in favor of the cases restricting joinder. In re
EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("We think the 'not dramatically dif-
ferent' standard used by the district court is inconsistent with these authorities."). The
court noted that "U]oinder of independent defendants is only appropriate where the
accused products or processes are the same in respects relevant to the patent." Id. But it
also noted that "the sameness of the accused products or processes is not sufficient. Claims
against independent defendants . . . cannot be joined under Rule 20's transaction-or-
occurrence test unless the facts underlying the claim of infringement asserted against each
defendant share an aggregate of operative facts." Id.
173 Rader, supra note 30, at 6.
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the Northern District of California, to test the existence of an upward
trend in the number of parties named in patent infringement lawsuits.
As the figures in the Appendix illustrate, this study indicates a
stark difference in joinder practice in patent infringement litigation
between these forums. In particular, it shows that, on average, patent
owners named significantly more accused infringers in initial com-
plaints filed originally in the Eastern District of Texas as compared to
those filed in the Northern District of California. 174 On average, initial
complaints filed originally in the Eastern District of Texas name
almost four times more accused infringers for the entire period
studied.1 75 Moreover, the study shows that, on average, the number of
accused infringers named in Eastern District of Texas complaints
steadily increased between 2008 and just prior to the effective date of
§ 299 in 2011, while in the Northern District of California the number
remained relatively constant.176
Furthermore, the initial complaints filed originally in the Eastern
District of Texas identify a significantly lower proportion of accused
infringers as having ties to the forum state when compared to initial
complaints filed originally in the Northern District of California.177 In
particular, the mean quarterly percentage of accused infringers with
identified ties to the forum state was 12% in the Eastern District of
174 See infra Table 1, Figures 1, 3 (comparing the number of accused infringers identified
in initial complaints filed originally in the Eastern District of Texas with number of accused
infringers identified in initial complaints filed originally in the Northern District of
California).
175 See infra Table 1 (indicating a mean of 9.1 defendants in the Eastern District of Texas
compared to 2.4 defendants in the Northern District of California). The stark difference
between these forums likely reflects the contrasting views of judges in these forums
regarding the appropriateness of joinder of accused infringers. Compare MyMail, Ltd. v.
Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456-57 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (allowing liberal joinder), with
WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (restricting joinder). It also likely reflects the unique circumstance
that the Federal Circuit has ordered the Eastern District of Texas to transfer patent
infringement cases nine times in recent years without ordering the Northern District of
California to transfer any cases. See supra note 24 (listing nine Federal Circuit opinions
ordering the Eastern District of Texas to transfer patent infringement cases). A search of
Westlaw for any opinion by the Federal Circuit ordering the Northern District of
California to transfer a patent infringement case failed to identify any such opinion.
176 See infra Figures 1, 3 (showing the average number of accused infringers named in
initial complaints filed originally in the Eastern District of Texas versus the Northern
District of California for each quarter of the relevant time period).
177 See infra Table 1, Figure 5 (comparing the proportion of accused infringers identified
in initial complaints filed in the Eastern District of Texas as having ties to Texas to the
proportion of accused infringers identified in initial complaints filed in the Northern
District of California as having ties to California).
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Texas compared to 41% in the Northern District of California.178 The
study further shows that, on average, the percentage of accused
infringers identified as having some tie to Texas in initial complaints
filed originally in the Eastern District of Texas generally was constant
and low between 2008 and just prior to the effective date of § 299 in
2011.179 Perhaps surprisingly, however, the study shows that in every
quarter except two since the second quarter of 2009, on average,
patent owners named more accused infringers with identified ties to
the forum state when suing in the Eastern District of Texas as com-
pared to the Northern District of California. 180
This information may reflect the use of strategies of decentraliza-
tion and localization by patent owners as they attempt to avoid the
transfer of cases out of the Eastern District of Texas. By decentraliza-
tion, I refer to naming accused infringers spread throughout the
country in an attempt to prevent a court from identifying any one
forum as being clearly more convenient than the forum selected by
the plaintiff. By localization, I refer to naming more accused infringers
with ties to the forum state, again in an attempt to prevent transfer.18'
To test more definitively for the strategy of decentralization, addi-
tional investigation and analysis of the complaints would be necessary,
including identifying the states associated with the accused infringers.
The strategy of localization, however, appears to be confirmed by
the study. Indeed, it is particularly clear that, on average, patent
owners filing initial complaints in the Eastern District between 2008
and the third quarter of 2010 joined more and more accused infringers
178 See infra Table 1 (identifying the mean quarterly percentage of accused infringers
with identified ties to the forum state as 12% in the Eastern District of Texas compared to
41% in the Northern District of California).
179 See infra Figure 5 (showing the proportion of accused infringers identified in initial
complaints filed in the Eastern District of Texas as having ties to Texas for each quarter of
the relevant time period).
180 See infra Figure 2 (comparing the mean number of accused infringers identified in
initial complaints filed in the Eastern District of Texas as having ties to Texas to the mean
number of accused infringers identified in initial complaints filed in the Northern District
of California as having ties to California). Even when comparing the median number of
defendants with an identified tie to the forum state, the Eastern District of Texas equaled
or exceeded the Northern District of California in every quarter, except one, since the
fourth quarter of 2009. See infra Figure 4 (comparing the median number of accused
infringers identified in initial complaints filed in the Eastern District of Texas as having ties
to Texas to the median number of accused infringers identified in initial complaints filed in
the Northern District of California as having ties to California).
181 Given the data, I do not refer to an increased percentage of accused infringers with
an identified tie to the forum state compared to accused infringers without any identified
ties to the forum state. That statistic remained relatively constant as applied to the Eastern
District of Texas between 2008 and 2011. See infra Figure 5 (showing the proportion of
accused infringers identified in initial complaints filed in the Eastern District of Texas as
having ties to Texas for each quarter of the relevant time period).
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in each case. Thus, Chief Judge Rader's reference to a "trend"
regarding the number of parties named in patent infringement law-
suits is supported by empirical evidence with respect to the Eastern
District of Texas. This trend likely spurred Congress and the President
to enact § 299 restricting permissive joinder of accused infringers.
III
THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT AND 35 U.S.C. § 299
Against the background of a split of authority among district
court judges regarding the appropriate interpretation and application
of Rule 20 and a trend toward increased joinder of defendants in
patent infringement litigation filed in the Eastern District of Texas,
Congress and the President enacted the America Invents Act. The
AIA effectively creates a new rule governing both permissive joinder
and consolidation for trial in most patent infringement litigation.
While the creation of this new rule may seem unsurprising given its
ability to resolve the conflicting views of various district court judges
regarding the proper standard for joinder, the step of repealing
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was in fact quite remarkable. 182
Rather than adhere to traditional conceptions of the policies under-
lying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-uniform rules for almost
all types of civil litigation, liberal joinder, and broad discretion pro-
vided to district courts-§ 299 creates a new rule specifically for most
patent infringement cases, restricts joinder, and seemingly removes
district courts' discretion. The remarkable nature of § 299 is best
understood after considering the new test it advances coupled with the
relatively sparse legislative history justifying it.
182 Congress has rarely repealed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for particular types
of civil litigation. In 1958, Judge Clark proudly reported that twenty years after the effec-
tive date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[n]otwithstanding many proposals,
Congress has withstood all attempts to obtain passage of procedural statutes of any conse-
quence. A search has turned up in the rules area only a single statute, one of no far-
reaching import." Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 435, 443 (1958). Other than the AIA, an example of a more recent, successful attempt
to obtain passage of a procedural statute of "consequence" is the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.). It set a higher pleading threshold for securities fraud litigation
than Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows "state of mind" allega-
tions underlying fraud to be pleaded generally. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)
(requiring complaints filed in securities fraud actions seeking money damages on proof
that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind to "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind"),
with FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's
mind may be alleged generally.").
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A. A New Test for Permissive Joinder and Consolidation for Trial
Section 19(d) of the AIA created a new statutory subsection, 35
U.S.C. § 299, governing permissive joinder of accused infringers and
consolidation for trial in most patent infringement cases.183 This new
statutory section applies to civil actions commenced on or after
September 16, 2011, the date President Obama signed the AIA into
law. 184 One way to understand this new statutory section is to contrast
its terms with the relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rules
20185 and 42.186 While there are many differences,187 the most
183 The new statutory section recites:
§ 19(d). Joinder of parties
(a) Joinder of Accused Infringers.-With respect to any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, other than an action or trial in
which an act of infringement under section 271(e)(2) has been pled, parties
that are accused infringers may be joined in one action as defendants or coun-
terclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, only if-
(1) any right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences relating to the making, using, importing
into the United States, offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product
or process; and
(2) questions of fact common to all defendants or counterclaim defendants will
arise in the action.
(b) Allegations Insufficient For Joinder.-For purposes of this subsection,
accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants or counter-
claim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on
allegations that they each have infringed the patent or patents in suit.
(c) Waiver.-A party that is an accused infringer may waive the limitations set
forth in this section with respect to that party.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012) (amended
2013).
184 See America Invents Act § 19(e), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 333 (2011) ("The
amendments made by this section shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act."); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 2
(announcing that President Obama signed the America Invents Act on September 16,
2011).
185 Rule 20 recites:
(2) Defendants. Persons-as well as a vessel, cargo, or other property subject
to admiralty process in rem-may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alter-
native with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
186 Rule 42 recites:
(a) CONSOLIDATFION. If actions before the court involve a common question of
law or fact, the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
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significant either relate to the applicability of § 299 or play a unique
role in its proper interpretation.
1. Applicability of § 299
Consider the fundamental issue of the applicability of § 299. A
first distinction is that, while Rules 20 and 42 apply practically to all
civil actions in federal district courts,188 § 299 applies only "to any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, other
than an action or trial in which an act of infringement under section
271(e)(2) has been pled." 189 This language can be divided into two
conceptual parts. The first part defines the outer boundary of the
scope of the application of the new statutory section ("any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents"). The second
part excludes from that scope cases with allegations of infringement
by certain drugs and veterinary biological products ("an action or trial
in which an act of infringement under section 271(e)(2) has been
pled").
While the second part is relatively straightforward, 190 the first
part raises basic questions regarding the scope of the application of
(b) SEPARATE TRIALS. For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a sep-
arate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
187 When contrasting the text of the old rules and § 19(d) of the AIA, one cannot help
but notice a blatant typographical error in the latter. The AIA stated that "parties that are
accused infringers may be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants,
or have their actions consolidated for trial, or counterclaim defendants only if" certain
heightened standards are met. Leahy-Smith American Invents Act § 19(d). Thus, the AIA
twice included the phrase "or counterclaim defendants." The House of Representatives
introduced this error-after the House Judiciary Committee reported the bill to the floor
of the House-when amendments extended the scope of the draft statute to address con-
solidation of trials. See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 33 (2011) (reporting the proposed
statute as stating "parties that are accused infringers may be joined in one action as defen-
dants or counterclaim defendants only if"); 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) ("As amended in the mark up and in the floor managers'
amendment, the bill extends the limit on joinder to also bar consolidation of trials of sepa-
rate actions."). The second use of the phrase was recently corrected in a legislative amend-
ment. Act of Jan. 14, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-274 § 1(c), 126 Stat. 2456 (2013).
188 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81."); FED. R. Civ.
P. 81(a) (listing exceptions).
189 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013).
190 Presumably, the exclusion of the pharmaceutical industry from the more rigorous
restrictions on permissive joinder and consolidation for trial added by § 299 reflects the
absence of any perceived problems with the number of accused infringers joined in patent
infringement cases involving drugs and veterinary biological products. Indeed, one would
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§ 299. In particular, the first part may not cover cases involving only
counterclaims alleging patent infringement. For example, consider a
case where the original complaint does not assert patent infringement,
but the patent owner's answer does. Is this a "civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents"? 191 No, it is not.
The statutory language suffers from the same problem high-
lighted by the Supreme Court in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc.192 There, the court held that cases with coun-
terclaims alleging infringement-but not claims alleging infringe-
ment-did not satisfy the statutory requirement of being "civil
action[s] arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." 193
One might argue that the remainder of § 299 indicates that it
should apply to cases involving only counterclaims alleging infringe-
ment, because it recites that "accused infringers may be joined in one
action as defendants or counterclaim defendants."1 9 4 But as a matter
of statutory interpretation this language does not define the category
of cases to which § 299 applies. Moreover, the language still has
meaning outside the context of applicability of the new statutory sec-
tion because cases involving claims of infringement may also include
counterclaims of infringement.
It is ironic that use of the language "any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents" introduces a problem similar
to the one identified by the Supreme Court in Holmes Group, because
a separate portion of the AIA corrected the particular problem high-
lighted in Holmes Group.195 To avoid the problem in § 299, Congress
could have inserted "or in any civil action in which a party has
asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under" after "arising
under."
suppose that the prototypical nature of patent infringement litigation in the pharmaceu-
tical industry involves one name-brand drug manufacturer suing one generic drug manu-
facturer for infringement. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418
F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (lawsuit by Warner-Lambert, a name-brand drug manufac-
turer, against Teva, a generic drug manufacturer, for patent infringement). An empirical
study regarding joinder and consolidation practices in this industry, including the locations
of these cases, would inform this supposition.
191 35 U.S.C. § 299.
192 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002) (addressing the same language and concluding that, for a
case to "arise[] under" patent law, the plaintiff's "complaint must establis[h] either that
federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessa-
rily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
193 Id. at 829-32 (internal quotations omitted) (discussing statutory language prior to
the enactment of the America Invents Act).
194 35 U.S.C. § 299 (emphasis added).
195 America Invents Act § 19(b), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 331-32 (2011)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)).
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Another distinction related to the fundamental issue of the appli-
cability of § 299 is that, while Rule 20 applies to joinder of
"[p]ersons,"1 96 the new statutory section applies to joinder of "parties
that are accused infringers."1 9 7 Thus, § 299 does not apply to persons
named in patent infringement lawsuits that are not accused infringers.
Such persons may include parties who might bring claims of infringe-
ment-owners or joint-owners of an asserted patent or exclusive
licensees of an asserted patent-or parties accused only of other
wrongs such as thefts of trade secrets. Moreover, while Rule 20
includes separate subsections for plaintiffs and defendants, 198 § 299
applies the same test to accused infringers whether they are "defen-
dants or counterclaim defendants." 199
Next, consider the relationship between the tests for permissive
joinder and consolidation for trial. Rule 20 addresses permissive
joinder of parties, and Rule 42 separately addresses consolidation for
trial. The two rules differ in terms of substantive standards. 200 Section
299, by contrast, applies one standard to both permissive joinder and
consolidation for trial. It states that parties that are accused infringers
"may be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defen-
dants, or have their actions consolidated for trial . . . only if" certain
requirements are met.201 Thus, the same standard will apply to ques-
tions of joinder and consolidation for trial in most patent-related
actions. 202
2. Substantive Standard of § 299
The most significant differences between the old rules and § 299,
of course, relate to the substantive standards governing permissive
joinder of accused infringers and consolidation for trial. Unlike Rules
196 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
197 35 U.S.C. § 299.
198 See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)-(b) (addressing joinder of plaintiffs and defendants,
respectively).
199 35 U.S.C. § 299.
200 Under Rule 20, permissive joinder is allowed if both the same transaction require-
ment and the common question of law or fact requirement are met. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
Under Rule 42, consolidation for trial requires only a common question of law or fact.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
201 35 U.S.C. § 299.
202 Rule 42, however, continues to apply to the issue of "join[ing] for hearing ... any or
all matters at issue" in separate actions. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1). Moreover, at least
arguably, Rule 42 continues to apply to "[consolidation of] the actions" as well as the more
general power conferred on district courts to "issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary
cost or delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2)-(3). To the extent Rule 42 continues to apply to
these issues, the standard it identifies differs substantially, requiring only a common ques-
tion of law or fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1); see infra Part IV.D (analyzing the extent to
which Rule 42 continues to apply after enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 299).
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20 and 42, § 299 restricts at least some of the discretion previously
afforded to both patent owners and courts on matters of joinder and
consolidation. Highlighting this new restriction, the new statutory sec-
tion uses the word "only." 203 It also includes a separate subsection
indicating what allegations courts must treat as insufficient for
joinder. 20 In these ways, the new law clarifies that the recited require-
ments must be satisfied to allow joinder or consolidation of accused
infringers for trial in the cases covered by § 299.205
Consider first the substantive standard governing permissive
joinder of defendants. Rule 20 articulates a two-pronged test. The first
prong is whether "any right to relief is asserted against [the defen-
dants] jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences." 2 0 6 The second prong is whether "any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." 207 Section
19(d) of the AIA modifies both prongs.
Regarding the first prong, § 299 adds the requirement that the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
"relat[e] to the making, using, importing into the United States,
offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product or process." 208
This new requirement thus lists actions that may be the basis of an
infringement claim.209 The key is that, for permissive joinder to be
appropriate under § 299, the object of these actions (the accused
product or process) must be "the same." The phrase "the same
accused product or process" requires interpretation, and I analyze
competing interpretations below. For now, however, it is useful simply
to recognize that this language adds a requirement beyond the Federal
Rules for permissive joinder.
203 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 20, 42 (not using "only" to describe when parties may be
joined or actions consolidated), with 35 U.S.C. § 299 (using "only").
204 35 U.S.C. § 299. For additional discussion of this subsection, see infra notes 213-15
and accompanying text.
205 A significant question remains concerning whether § 299 repeals Rule 21, which in
pertinent part gives district courts discretion to add parties to a lawsuit. FED. R. Civ. P. 21;
see infra Part IV.D (concluding that § 299 does not repeal Rule 21).
206 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
207 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B).
208 35 U.S.C. § 299.
209 The listed actions mirror the actions identified in the statutory section defining direct
infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."). Notably, however, § 299 does not
list other forms of infringement, including infringement related to exportation activities.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006) (defining infringement based on exportation activities).
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Regarding the second prong of Rule 20, § 299 similarly changes
the requirement, making it, at least theoretically, more difficult for
permissive joinder to be appropriate. It requires that "questions of
fact common to all defendants or counterclaim defendants will arise in
the action." 210 Thus, a common question of law will not suffice-nor
will a singular common question of fact. Rather, multiple common
"questions of fact" must exist.
Section 19(d) of the AIA also creates a new substantive standard
to test the appropriateness of consolidation for trial. Like the standard
governing permissive joinder of accused infringers, the new standard
is more difficult to meet than that of the relevant Federal Rule.
Section 19(d) replaces the simple test articulated in Rule 42-whether
the "actions before the court involve a common question of law or
fact" 211-with the complex, two-pronged permissive joinder analysis
discussed above.212 Thus, a common question of law is no longer suffi-
cient to consolidate actions for trial, nor is a singular common ques-
tion of fact. Instead, more than one common question of fact must
exist, as must allegations of infringement against "the same accused
product or process."
Congress expressed these new standards governing permissive
joinder and consolidation for trial-which really are just one stan-
dard-in positive terms in subsection (a) of the new statutory sec-
tion.213 This use of positive terms is similar to the language of Rules 20
and 42. But § 299 goes further. Subsection (b) states, in negative
terms, when accused infringers may not be joined in one action or
have their cases consolidated for trial: "[A]ccused infringers may not
be joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or
have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations
that they each have infringed the patent or patents in sUit."214 This
subsection at first appears superfluous: Subsection (a) already indi-
cates that an allegation of infringement of the same patent alone
would be insufficient to justify joinder or consolidation for trial. But,
210 35 U.S.C. § 299.
211 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
212 As discussed above, § 299 requires that
any right to relief [be] asserted against the accused infringers jointly, severally,
or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences relating to the making,
using, importing into the United States, offering for sale, or selling of the same
accused product or process; and questions of fact common to all defendants or
counterclaim defendants will arise in the action.
35 U.S.C. § 299(a).
213 Id.
214 Id.
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as I will discuss below, subsection (b) is useful in interpreting the
meaning of "same accused product or process." 215 Moreover, this sub-
section highlights the magnitude of the departure from particularly
permissive interpretations of Rules 20 and 42.
Also unlike Rules 20 and 42, subsection (c) of § 299 allows
accused infringers to waive the restrictions on permissive joinder and
consolidation for trial.216 In many cases, it effectively requires patent
owners and all accused infringers to agree to joinder of the accused
infringers or to consolidation for trial.
The waiver contemplated by § 299 may be prospective or retro-
spective. Prospectively, for example, parties may negotiate these
waivers and include them in license agreements long before litigation
is threatened. Alternatively, parties may negotiate these waivers con-
temporaneously with the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit, either
before or after joinder of multiple accused infringers. An unresolved
question is whether waiver may be implied by the conduct of the
alleged infringers.
Note that any waiver eliminates only the "limitations set forth in
this section with respect to that party." 2 1 7 The restrictions on joinder
and consolidation for trial set forth in Rules 20 and 42 therefore still
apply, even if all accused infringers waive the heightened standard set
forth in § 299. When there is a waiver, however, the application of
Rules 20 and 42 may be academic for two reasons. First, in any case in
which all accused infringers agree to waive the requirements of the
new statutory section, presumably no party will challenge joinder or
consolidation. Second, even if a judge sua sponte raises a question
regarding either issue-which seems possible but unlikely-the
requirements of Rules 20 and 42 may be satisfied by the same facts
that caused the accused infringers to waive the heightened require-
ments of § 299.218 For example, multiple accused infringers may waive
the heightened requirements of § 299 because they enjoy indemnifica-
tion from a particular component manufacturer and therefore plan to
share counsel and adopt common strategies. As discussed below,
accused infringers sharing a single component manufacturer may or
215 See infra Part IV (discussing how subsection (b) supports an interpretation of § 299
that focuses on concerted action).
216 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013) ("A party that is an accused infringer may waive the limitations set forth
in this section with respect to that party.").
217 Id.
218 Accused infringers would be more likely to waive the heightened requirements of
§ 299 when they have relationships with other accused infringers that may satisfy the lesser
requirements of Rules 20 and 42. I consider particular types of relationships in Part IV.D,
infra.
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may not be subject to joinder pursuant to § 299, depending upon the
interpretation of "same product or process." 219 But their joinder in
one lawsuit is likely appropriate under Rule 20, which requires only a
right to relief arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and a
common question of law or fact.
B. The Legislative History
As shown, there are radical differences between the relevant
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and § 299. Given these differences, it
is quite surprising that, prior to the enactment of the AIA, no scholar-
ship addressed any perceived problem with the Federal Rules gov-
erning joinder or consolidation for trial in patent infringement
litigation; nor did any scholarship address the split of authority as to
their proper interpretation. More broadly-other than a perceived
problem that courts too often restrict joinder 220-no scholarship iden-
tified any specific defect in the rules governing permissive joinder and
consolidation with respect to any type of litigation.221 And the idea
that courts too often restrict joinder is quite the opposite of what
apparently motivated Congress and the President to enact the rele-
vant portion of the AIA. Under these circumstances, one might
expect the legislative history of the AIA to provide detailed explana-
tions about why Congress and the President enacted such sweeping
changes. However, the legislative history is quite sparse in this regard.
1. Report of the House Judiciary Committee
The House Judiciary Committee's report contains the most
detailed discussion of permissive joinder of accused infringers. The
report references "problems occasioned by the joinder of defendants
219 See infra Part IV.A.1.
220 See McFarland, supra note 56, at 258-70 (analyzing the history, development, and
judicial application of Rule 20 and concluding that "[o]ne has to search long and hard for a
decision that may have too generously allowed permissive joinder"); see also Note, Joinder
of Controlling Non-Parties: Eliminating Hide-and-Seek in Patent Litigation, 70 YALE L.J.
1166 (1961) (arguing in favor of joinder of parties controlling accused patent infringers);
Matthew K.K. Sumida, Comment, Defendant Class Actions and Patent Infringement
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REv. 843, 845 (2011) (concluding that "defendant class actions
appear to be an appropriate method of adjudicating patent infringement claims").
221 Professor John Oakley, for example, has recognized that "liberal joinder rules, com-
bined with the high cost of litigation and strict rules of claim and issue preclusion, have
made the typical modern federal civil action a multi-claim, multi-party action which often
involves exquisitely complex clusters of claims and massively sprawling sets of parties."
John B. Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts: The State of the
Union of Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REv. 35, 36 (2001). He does not suggest any
defect in the rules governing permissive joinder or consolidation, however, but instead
focuses his attention on the proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which governs sup-
plemental jurisdiction. Id. at 37-38.
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(sometimes numbering in the dozens) who have tenuous connections
to the underlying disputes." 222 The report, however, does not actually
identify any of these problems. Nevertheless, as discussed above, a
considered analysis indicates that these problems include inefficient
resolution of disputes, increased costs borne by accused infringers,
strike suits, and forum shopping by patent owners.
In a footnote, the report states that the new statutory section
"legislatively abrogates the construction of Rule 20(a) adopted in"
various opinions, including MyMail (which the report lists first). 223
Thus, the approach advocated in MyMail almost certainly is no longer
appropriate in patent infringement cases governed by § 299. That is,
the appropriateness of joinder of accused infringers probably does not
turn on an analysis of evidence presented after the close of discovery
regarding whether the accused products or methods are dramatically
different.2 2 4
The report's footnote goes on to state that § 299 "effectively con-
form[s] these courts' jurisprudence to that followed by a majority of
jurisdictions." 225 This, however, may not be so. To start, courts dis-
puted which line of cases constituted the majority view. 2 2 6 Moreover,
the standard articulated in § 299 may not reflect the jurisprudence of
many jurisdictions that did not follow the MyMail approach. Indeed,
various decisions that found joinder inappropriate interpreted Rule 20
222 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54 (2011).
223 Id. at 55 n.61. In addition to MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D.
Tex. 2004), other cases cited include: Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-
446, 2010 WL 3835762 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010); Alford Safety Servs., Inc. v. Hot-Hed,
Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010); Mannatech, Inc. v. Country
Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010); Better Educ.,
Inc. v. Einstruction Corp., No. 2-08-cv-446, 2010 WL 918307 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2010);
Adrain v. Genetec Inc., No. 2:08-CV-423, 2009 WL 3063414 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009); and
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006).
224 See MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 457.
225 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 55 n.61 (2011).
226 One judge in the Northern District of Illinois said:
After researching the issue, the Court determines that MyMail's approach is in
the minority. This Court follows the prevailing approach of this District and
numerous others that have concluded that a party fails to satisfy Rule 20(a)'s
requirement of a common transaction or occurrence where unrelated defen-
dants, based on different acts, are alleged to have infringed the same patent.
Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp., No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011)
(emphasis added). But another judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana held:
The Defendants in MyMail, Ltd. did cite several district court cases which had
one view that held that ' . . . infringement by separate defendants [does] not
satisfy the same transaction requirement.' . . . While some courts do hold that
view, the majority hold the view that joinder is proper in patent infringement
suits [when alleged infringement is based on the same patents].
Alford Safety Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 3418233, at *10 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2013] 701
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
differently. As discussed above, some required the absence of any dif-
ference-however slight-between accused products or methods.227
Others required some connection between accused infringers, ranging
from cooperation to concerted action to collusion,228 while one
required a reasonable inference of a common scheme of infringe-
ment. 22 9 Still others required both (1) cooperation, concerted activity,
collusion, or a common scheme of infringement and (2) the absence of
differences among the accused methods or products.230 In short, the
standard articulated in § 299 must be interpreted in light of a variety
of prior standards.
2. Transcript of the House Judiciary Committee Markup Hearing
The transcript of the House Judiciary Committee's markup
hearing also provides relevant background regarding the AIA provi-
sions related to joinder and consolidation for trial.231 In particular, the
transcript provides insight into policies behind the provisions ulti-
mately enacted into law. For example, Congressman Bob Goodlatte
stated that "one of the driving goals of [the] legislation was to reduce
patent litigation abuses." In his view, the "joinder language accom-
plishes this purpose by ensuring that only those parties related to a
single cause of action are brought together in the same suit." 232 Patent
litigation abuses, though not specifically identified in the legislative
history, may include improper forum shopping (such as forum shop-
ping intended to increase the cost of litigation for accused infringers
for leverage in settlement negotiations) and strike suits filed by so-
called "patent trolls," as discussed above. Moreover, Congressman
Goodlatte's statement highlights that at least one congressman
believed the new provisions would ensure that only parties related to a
single cause of action could be joined in the same lawsuit.
3. House Floor Debate
After the House Judiciary Committee completed its markup of
the legislation, the House of Representatives debated the merits of
the legislation and held several votes. The first proposed amendment,
submitted by Congressman Lamar Smith (the "Smith Amendment"),
227 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (analyzing cases).
228 See supra note 160-61 and accompanying text (analyzing cases).
229 See supra note 162 and accompanying text (analyzing cases).
230 See supra note 163 and accompanying text (analyzing cases).
231 Hearing on Markup of H.R. 1249 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
63 (2011) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), avail-
able at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/04142011MarkupTranscript.pdf. Rep.
Goodlatte was a cosponsor of the bill.
232 Id.
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proposed (1) pxpanding the scope of the legislation beyond permissive
joinder to cover consolidation for trial and (2) allowing accused
infringers to waive the heightened requirements governing permissive
joinder and consolidation for trial.2 33 These two elements of the AIA
ultimately became law.234
During the debate, Congressman Goodlatte addressed the
intended effect of the legislation. He stated, "The bill also restricts
joinder rules for patent litigation. Specifically, it restricts joinder of
defendants to cases [sic, claims] arising out of the same facts and
transactions, which ends the abusive practice of treating as codefend-
ants parties who make completely different products and have no
relation to each other."235 Thus, Congressman Goodlatte focused on
the goal of restricting joinder. But while he had previously wished to
restrict joinder to parties "related to a single cause of action," he sub-
sequently omitted the idea of a relationship to a single cause of action.
Instead, he indicated that the proposed legislation would restrict
joinder, more severely, to "cases [sic, claims] arising out of the same
facts and transactions"-that is, to situations when a single claim
based on the same "facts and transactions" can be brought against
multiple accused infringers. This more severe restriction on joinder
fails to comport exactly with the breadth of the language included in
the enacted law, which allows permissive joinder when any right to
relief is asserted "with respect to or arising out of" the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. 236
Congressman Goodlatte also made it clear that he opposed
joinder of defendants who make "completely different products and
have no relation to each other,"237 but he again failed to explain how
this conduct is abusive. Further, his suggestion that "completely dif-
ferent products" would not justify joinder does not provide much
insight into the proper interpretation of "same accused product or
method" in close cases and, in fact, tends to track the discarded
MyMail approach.
None of the other speakers in the House addressed the portions
of the pending legislation and amendment regarding permissive
joinder and consolidation for trial. Ultimately, the House overwhelm-
ingly passed the Smith Amendment, extending the scope of the
233 See 157 CONG. REC. H4446 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (listing proposed amendments).
234 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299(b), (c) (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013).
235 157 CONG. REC. H4426 (daily ed. June 22, 2011).
236 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1) (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013) (emphasis added).
237 157 CONG. REC. H4426 (daily ed. June 22, 2011).
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legislation to cover consolidation for trial and including the waiver
provision. 238 Then, after consideration of various other amendments
unrelated to permissive joinder and consolidation, the House over-
whelmingly voted in favor of what became the final text of the
AIA. 239
4. Senate Floor Debate
After the House passed its bill, the Senate considered and passed
the legislation without amendment. 240 During the floor debate,
Senator Jon Kyl 2 4 1 addressed the provisions of the legislation affecting
permissive joinder and consolidation for trial. He was the only
member of the Senate to discuss the joinder section of the AIA.
Senator Kyl began his remarks by stating that "[t]his new section
bars joinder of accused infringers as codefendants, or consolidation of
their cases for trial, if the only common fact and transaction among
the defendants is that they are alleged to have infringed the same
patent." 242 Notably, this summary focuses on the joinder prohibition
articulated in the second subsection of the new statutory section.
Senator Kyl did not address the positive requirements for joinder
articulated in the first subsection. Senator Kyl went on, however, to
make the following provocative statement: "This provision effectively
codifies current law as it has been applied everywhere outside of the
Eastern District of Texas." 243 This statement creates a false dichotomy
between the Eastern District of Texas and the rest of the country's
courts, and incorrectly characterizes the divergent applications of
Rule 20 outside that district as one approach consistent with the
approach adopted in the legislation.
First, consider the false dichotomy between the Eastern District
of Texas and "everywhere" else. The judges of the Eastern District of
238 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Roll Call Vote 481, 157 Cong. Rec. H4480-01
(daily ed. June 23, 2011), 20011 WL 2495388 (recording final vote of 283 to 140 in favor of
the proposed amendment).
239 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Roll Call Vote No. 491, 157 CONG. REC.
H4504 (daily ed. June 23, 2011), 2011 WL 2495388 (recording final vote of 304 to 117 in
favor of the legislation).
240 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Roll Call Vote No. 129 Leg., 157 CONG. REC.
S5442 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011), 2011 WL 3962364 (recording final vote of 89 to 9 in favor of
the legislation).
241 Senator Kyl was a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the relevant
time period and a cosponsor of the bill. See Committee Members, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/members.cfm (last visited Feb.
21, 2013) (listing Senator Kyl as a committee member).
242 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
243 Id. (citing Rudd v. LUX Prods. Corp., No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 12, 2011) and H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54-55 (2011)).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
704 [Vol. 88:652
PATENT MISJOINDER
Texas were not alone in their interpretation. District judges in the
District of Kansas, the Northern District of Texas, and the Eastern
District of Louisiana all adopted similarly broad interpretations of
Rules 20 and 42.244 Moreover, the view within the Eastern District of
Texas was not consistent: One judge there adopted a more narrow
interpretation of the relevant rules.2 4 5 The Eastern District of Texas's
patent jurisprudence was neither unique nor perfectly consistent.
Senator Kyl's characterization of the law outside the Eastern
District of Texas was similarly incorrect. While courts including the
Northern District of California, the Northern District of Illinois, and
the Western District of Washington interpreted the relevant rules
more narrowly, they had not adopted one consistent interpretation of
those rules.2 4 6 The idea that courts outside the Eastern District of
Texas had adopted one standard for resolving questions of permissive
joinder of accused patent infringers is not accurate.
Senator Kyl's additional remarks addressed the effect of the
AIA's bar on consolidation of separate trials. He focused on existing
legal authority that allows for trial consolidation under Rule 42 even
where joinder is barred under Rule 20.247 He concluded:
If a court that was barred from joining defendants in one action
could instead simply consolidate their cases for trial under [R]ule
42, [Slection 299's purpose of allowing unrelated patent defendants
to insist on being tried separately would be undermined. Section 299
thus adopts a common standard for both joinder of defendants and
consolidation of their cases for trial.248
Besides highlighting Senator Kyl's understanding of one of the
purposes of § 299-"allowing unrelated patent defendants to insist on
244 See, e.g., Alford Safety Servs., Inc. v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233,
at *10-11 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010) (finding the "transaction" requirement met because the
patent owner alleged that each defendant infringed the same patents); Mannatech, Inc. v.
Country Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010)
(same); Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 617-18 (D. Kan.
2006) (same).
245 See Reid v. Gen. Motors Corp., 240 F.R.D. 260, 263 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that
infringement claims do not arise from the same transaction when they are based on dif-
ferent acts by unrelated parties).
246 See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (analyzing approaches to Rule 20 by
district courts).
247 See 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(citing and quoting Ohio v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 500, 503 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
and 9A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR P. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2382 (3d ed. 2008) and citing Kenvin v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 37 F.R.D.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) and Stanford v. TVA, 18 F.R.D. 152 (M.D. Tenn. 1955)).
248 Id.
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being tried separately"249-these remarks raise a significant question
regarding the scope of the new statutory section.
Senator Kyl refers to a court joining defendants in one action
rather than a plaintiff joining defendants in one action. Notably, Rule
20 uses passive voice, allowing that "[p]ersons . . . may be joined in
one action as defendants," without expressly referring to the entity
doing the joining.250 The context, however-a rule entitled "permis-
sive joinder"-indicates that joinder is an action taken when the
plaintiff names a defendant in a complaint. Moreover, Rules 19, 21,
and 42 largely use different terms to refer to actions by courts. Courts
may "order that the person be made a party,"251 "add" parties,252
"join . . . matters,"253 and "consolidate the actions." 254 None of these
actions involve "joining" a party. The new statutory section uses con-
sistent terminology, indicating that "parties . . . may be joined" and
"accused infringers may not be joined," again using passive voice
without identifying the actor.255 Thus, with respect to joinder, one
might interpret the new statutory section as restricting only the ability
of patent owners to join accused infringers, not the ability of courts to
take other actions. Senator Kyl, however, seems to have a different,
broader interpretation that would restrict the ability of courts to join
parties in one lawsuit. I return to this issue below when considering
the extent to which the new statutory section repealed preexisting
law.256
IV
INTERPRETING AND APPLYING 35 U.S.C. § 299
The new statutory section, 35 U.S.C. § 299, raises important
interpretive questions. Here I provide an analysis of two competing
249 Id. Senator Kyl's counsel on the Senate Judiciary Committee later explained that
§ 299 "should put an end to a practice that had become a favorite tactic of patent trolls:
suing a large number of unrelated patent defendants in a single action." Joe Matal, A
Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J.
539, 592 (2012). Eliminating this "favorite tactic of patent trolls," Senator Kyl suggested,
would ensure that accused infringers had the opportunity to obtain separate trials. Id.
("Because courts typically do not increase the time for presenting evidence during a trial
by a multiple of the number of defendants who are sued, the Eastern District of Texas's
interpretation of Rule 20 resulted in a substantial denial of due process to defendants.").
250 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
251 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).
252 FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
253 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1).
254 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2).
255 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299(a), (b) (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013).
256 See infra Part IV.D (identifying procedures still available after § 299 went into
effect).
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interpretations of its key operative language, "same accused product
or process." 257 I also analyze two potential procedures for determining
whether accused products or processes are the "same accused product
or process." Finally, I weigh whether § 299 repeals other procedural
tools that allow district courts to streamline management of cases.
A. "Same Accused Product or Process"
There are two possible interpretations of "same accused product
or process." First, "same" may refer to one, and only one, thing (the
"one thing" interpretation). 258 Under this interpretation, "same
accused product or process" refers to one accused product or process.
As a result, multiple accused infringers may not be joined in one law-
suit, or have their cases consolidated for trial, unless they are all
responsible for infringement with respect to that one accused product
or process. In this regard, one accused product is easy to envision: It is
one physical device. One accused process is more difficult to identify.
It could refer to the actions taken by a single thing-for example, a
procedure used by a single computer program. Even though a com-
puter program may run repeatedly, it executes one procedure each
time, so one may understand that the procedure itself is the "same
process," regardless of when it is executed. Alternatively, "same pro-
cess" could refer to the actions taken by a single thing at a particular
time. Using the example of a computer program, each instance of exe-
cution of the procedure would be considered a separate process.
Second, "same accused product or process" may refer to multiple
separate things that so closely resemble one another or correspond
that they are indistinguishable in all relevant respects (the "indist-
inguishability interpretation"). 259 Using this interpretation, separate
accused infringers may be joined in one lawsuit or have their cases
consolidated for trial if their accused products are indistinguishable in
their construction, operation, or both, depending on the asserted
patent claim's scope. Similarly, separate accused infringers may be
joined in one lawsuit or have their cases consolidated for trial if their
accused processes are indistinguishable with respect to their steps,
again depending on the scope of the asserted claim.
257 35 U.S.C. § 299.
258 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1099 (11th ed. 2003) (defining
one interpretation of "same" as "being the one under discussion or already referred to"
and noting that "same may imply ... that the things under consideration are one thing and
not two or more things").
259 See id. (including definitions of "same" as "resembling in every relevant respect,"
"corresponding so closely as to be indistinguishable," and "equal in size, shape, value, or
importance-usually used with the").
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Neither the text nor the legislative history of the AIA indicates
which of these interpretations is correct. The legislative history indi-
cates that various members of Congress understood that the purpose
of the new statutory section was to restrict joinder, to curb litigation
abuses, to restrict cases to one cause of action, to restrict joinder to
situations when accused infringers are related, or to codify the law as
it existed outside the Eastern District of Texas. 260 But these disparate
views do not provide any coherent explanation in favor of either inter-
pretation of the new statutory section. Indeed, the only thing that is
certain, given both the language of the new statutory section and legis-
lative history, is that the MyMail approach-in which permissive
joinder turns on whether accused products or methods are dramati-
cally different-is no longer the law.
In the absence of any indication from the text or legislative his-
tory regarding which interpretation is correct, one is left to consider
the policies behind joinder of parties. Indeed, this is the approach
advocated by scholars studying the question of permissive joinder
outside the context of patent infringement litigation.261 As discussed
above, however, there are various competing policies in play.262 These
include focusing disputes on substantive issues rather than procedural
issues, reducing costs, and limiting inappropriate joinder to prevent
undue hardship on defendants. 263 In the abstract, these competing
policies do not provide any definite direction regarding the appro-
priate interpretation of "same." When considered in the context of
specific hypothetical situations, however, the indistinguishability inter-
pretation often stands out as serving both sets of policies better than
the "one thing" interpretation.
1. Hypothetical Situations
To test the result of adopting each interpretation of "same
accused product or process," consider the following hypothetical
situations.
Hypothetical Situation No. 1
First, consider a situation where a retailer sells a product to a
customer. If a patent owner claims that the product's sale and use
260 See supra Part III.B.
261 See, e.g., Kane, supra note 12, at 1747 (arguing that this inquiry is fact-specific and
turns on whether the policy would be better effectuated by a broad or narrow joinder
interpretation).
262 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (analyzing competing policies consid-
ered by the Advisory Committee).
263 See id.
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both infringe its patent, should the patent owner be permitted to join
both the retailer and the customer as accused infringers in the same
lawsuit?
Both policies discussed above-liberal joinder and restricted
joinder-favor joinder in this context. Of course efficiencies would be
gained by eliminating any dispute regarding the propriety of joinder in
the first place. But both those favoring liberal joinder and those
favoring restrictions on joinder would probably agree that efficiencies
based on the multiplicity of common questions related to infringement
would outweigh any inefficiencies associated with joinder. Also, it
seems unlikely that the customer would prefer a litigation strategy dif-
ferent from the retailer given the large overlap of infringement issues
and possible indemnification by the retailer. Thus, advocates of either
liberal or restrictive joinder would support joining the defendants. Sig-
nificantly, both the "one thing" and the indistinguishability interpreta-
tions discussed above would result in allowing joinder: There is one
device that is made and sold by the accused infringers, and therefore
no difference whatsoever.
Hypothetical Situation No. 2
In contrast, consider a situation where two unrelated competitors
sell their own products. Joining the parties would create some efficien-
cies. The patent owner could draft one complaint. The court could
hold one claim construction hearing and, ultimately, one trial. But the
risk of undue hardship at a minimum raises questions regarding
whether joinder is appropriate. For example, there is a risk that the
jury may overlook differences in the operation of the competitors'
products that are significant in terms of liability.
In this situation, adopting the "one thing" interpretation would
result in no joinder, while adopting the indistinguishability interpreta-
tion could result in joinder, depending on the level of similarity
between products. Given that the efficiency of joining the competitors
also depends on their level of similarity, it may be preferable to adopt
the indistinguishability interpretation as a matter of policy. 2 64
264 To reach a final conclusion regarding efficiency, one must consider transaction costs
associated with the determination of whether joinder is appropriate. The determination
regarding the level of similarity between products or processes will involve costs and may,
in particular cases, involve substantial costs. Indeed, extensive discovery and briefing may
be required to compare and contrast accused products or processes. An optimal solution,
then, might favor adoption of the indistinguishability interpretation coupled with strict lim-
itations on the procedure used to make the determination of indistinguishability. These
limitations would reduce transaction costs. In Part IV.B, infra, I analyze additional consid-
erations with respect to the procedure used to determine indistinguishability.
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Hypothetical Situation No. 3
A third possible scenario involves an original equipment manu-
facturer ("OEM") that produces devices and sells them to two
retailers. The only difference between the devices sold to the two
retailers is the brand name attached to the devices by the OEM. For
devices sold to the first retailer, the OEM attaches the name of the
first retailer. For devices sold to the second retailer, the OEM attaches
the name of the second retailer.
Here, the benefits of joining the two parties likely outweigh the
drawbacks. In particular, joinder probably would not impose any
undue hardship on the retailers. Given the shared OEM, the retailers
would be expected to coordinate their activities either as a matter of
prudent litigation strategy or as a contractual matter due to indemnifi-
cation by the OEM.265
Application of the competing interpretations, however, would
cause different results. Under the "one thing" interpretation, a patent
owner would not be able to join both retailers in the same lawsuit. The
devices sold by each retailer are not the "same" in the sense that they
are separate-albeit virtually duplicate-devices. The retailers are
therefore not responsible for infringement based on action taken with
respect to one device. Under the indistinguishability interpretation, by
contrast, a patent owner would be able to join both retailers in the
same lawsuit. The devices are the "same" in the sense that they so
closely resemble one another or correspond that they are indistin-
guishable in all relevant respects. In particular, the physical structure
and functionality of the devices are indistinguishable. As in
Hypothetical Situation No. 2, this hypothetical indicates that the
indistinguishability interpretation is preferable.
Hypothetical Situation No. 4
A fourth hypothetical situation involves two competitors who
both purchase parts from a single component manufacturer. The parts
have the same construction and functionality, but the competitors use
the parts in devices that differ overall.
265 The OEM and these retailers might waive any objection to joinder. Therefore, the
interpretation of "same accused product or process" probably should not turn on this
hypothetical. Section 299 may be viewed as a device to empower patent owners and courts
to force accused infringers to submit to more efficient organization of patent infringement
litigation. In this hypothetical, that power is probably unnecessary. On the other hand, the
interpretation of "same accused product or process" should not arbitrarily require an inef-
ficient organization of patent infringement litigation, so situations where accused infringers
refuse to waive the heightened restrictions still matter.
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Applying the new statutory section's competing policies and
interpretations is more complicated here because the scope of any
asserted patent claim becomes an important variable in the analysis. If
the asserted claim is directed to the structure or functionality of the
entire final device, and not just the component, then joining the two
defendants may be improper. The differences between the two com-
panies' final devices may be so significant as to cause inefficiencies
and prejudicial confusion. Here, both interpretations of "same
accused product" probably result in the denial of joinder. In partic-
ular, the "one thing" interpretation would deny joinder because each
competitor would be responsible for its own final device. Presumably
the indistinguishability interpretation would require the same result
because of the differences between the competitors' devices.
If instead the asserted claim is directed to the structure or func-
tionality of the component part, then both policies probably favor
joinder. Joinder probably would not create any undue hardship on the
competitors. Indeed, similar to the third hypothetical, given the
shared component, the competitors would be expected to coordinate
their activities, either as a matter of prudent litigation strategy or as a
contractual matter due to indemnification by the component manufac-
turer. Here, however, the competing interpretations would cause dif-
ferent results. The "one thing" interpretation would prevent joinder
because there are separate final devices, while the indistinguishability
interpretation would permit joinder because the two companies pur-
chased identical component parts. Thus, like the third hypothetical,
consideration of this fourth hypothetical in the context of a claim
directed to the structure or functionality of the component counsels
adoption of the indistinguishability interpretation of "same accused
product."
Hypothetical Situation No. 5
A fifth hypothetical situation involves three companies that sell
products that comply with a common industry standard. Two of the
companies participated in the development of the standard and sell
products that comply with the standard, while the third company did
not participate in the development of the standard but nonetheless
sells a product that complies with the standard.
Like the fourth hypothetical situation, determining if joinder is
proper depends in large part upon the scope of any asserted patent
claim. But this situation is even more complicated, because resolving
the joinder question will also depend upon the relationship of the
asserted patent claim to the industry standard. In particular, in deter-
mining whether joinder is appropriate in the context of compliance
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with an industry standard, it is important to identify whether a partic-
ular patent claim is essential to the standard. 266 Essentiality means
that the technology described by one of the patent's claims must be
used in order to comply with the standard. In other words, for a patent
to be essential to an industry standard, compliance with the standard
must necessarily result in infringement. Compliance with the standard
does not necessarily result in infringement, for example, if the stan-
dard requires use of any one of three methods and only one of the
three methods infringes.
If a patent claim is essential to an industry standard, even a
restrictive approach favors joining the three accused infringers if they
all comply with the industry standard. Efficiencies associated with
joinder will be numerous, and undue hardship probably does not exist
given the similarities between products. Application of the two inter-
pretations of "same accused product," however, may reach different
results. The "one thing" interpretation would not permit joinder
because there is not one device, but the indistinguishability interpreta-
tion may permit joinder if compliance with the industry standard
means that the three companies' devices are structurally or function-
ally indistinguishable.
Significantly, the conclusions related to the fifth hypothetical situ-
ation do not depend on whether the accused infringers participated in
the development of the standard or merely complied with the stan-
dard. Rather, the relevant focal point is compliance with the standard
and whether the patent claim at issue is essential to that standard.
2. Conclusions Based on Hypothetical Situations
The preceding hypotheticals indicate that "same accused product
or process" should be interpreted to require indistinguishability rather
than requiring one product or process, at least in the absence of signif-
icant costs in determining indistinguishability. A test based on indist-
inguishability avoids undue hardship and potential prejudice
associated with differences in accused products or processes, while
permitting efficiencies associated with joinder when accused products
are indistinguishable. 267
266 See WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (noting that the patent owner made "no showing ... that
practicing the asserted patents is essential to complying with the protocol in all instances").
267 An interpretation embracing indistinguishability, as opposed to one product or pro-
cess, would be consistent with the Federal Circuit's resolution of the split of authority
regarding the correct interpretation of Rule 20. See In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Joinder of independent defendants is only appropriate where the
accused products or processes are the same in respects relevant to the patent."). It would
therefore prevent divergent approaches to joinder depending on whether the case is
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Before considering the appropriate procedure to analyze compli-
ance with the new statutory section, it is important to note a common
factual theme among the hypothetical situations where prudential
concerns favor joinder. In each, a key factor appears to be a relatively
loose understanding of concerted action. For example, a sale of a
device by a retailer to a customer involves actions of two parties
working together toward the common goal of transferring ownership
of a device. The use of a common OEM or a common component
manufacturer by two retailers likewise indicates a level of coordinated
action. Compliance with an industry standard also indicates that par-
ties are effectively working together with respect to the structure or
operation of their devices. In short, concerted action appears to be a
proxy for similarity of products or processes. While concerted action
does not always mean that accused infringers' products are indistin-
guishable, concerted action makes indistinguishability more likely.
Indeed, the more concerted the action, the more likely that the prod-
ucts are indistinguishable-and therefore, the more likely that joinder
is appropriate. 268
The fact that concerted action indicates that joinder is more
appropriate should not come as any surprise. As discussed above, in
its only case squarely addressing the question of permissive joinder of
parties, the Supreme Court focused on allegations of concerted action
by two defendants. 269 Furthermore, the leading opinion on the issue of
permissive joinder, the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Mosley v. General
Motors Corp., found permissive joinder appropriate because it found
a "logical relationship" between separate acts in the form of concerted
action.270 Moreover, in several copyright and trademark infringement
lawsuits-and a Second Circuit case involving antitrust claims-courts
governed by Rule 20 or the new statutory section. Indeed, as the above hypotheticals indi-
cate, § 299 would be dramatically more restrictive than Rule 20 under the "one product or
process" approach.
268 Requiring concerted action would also ensure compliance with the same transaction
or occurrence requirement that was preserved from Rule 20. Compare FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a)(2)(A) (requiring that "any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences") with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35
U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012) (amended 2013) (requiring that "any right to relief is asserted
against the parties jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences"). In my view,
concerted action is a different articulation of the "shared aggregate of operative facts" test
articulated by the Federal Circuit when it interpreted Rule 20. See In re EMC Corp., 677
F.3d at 1359 ("Claims against independent defendants ... cannot be joined under [Rule
20's] transaction-or-occurrence test unless the facts underlying the claim of infringement
asserted against each defendant share an aggregate of operative facts.").
269 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965).
270 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2013]1 713
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
have rejected attempts to name multiple defendants in single actions
because the claimant failed to allege concerted action.271
Given these policy considerations and precedent, patent owners
should highlight concerted action when attempting to join multiple
alleged patent infringers. The Supreme Court has reversed the Federal
Circuit in the past for adopting standards unique to patent infringe-
ment cases. 272 And other judicial decisions, including cases involving
alleged infringement of copyright and trademark rights, focused on
the presence of concerted action to determine whether joinder is
appropriate. As a result, a court seeking to apply the new statutory
section would be well advised to recognize that concerted action may
serve as a signal regarding the appropriateness of joining accused
infringers in patent cases.
Notably, "concerted action" here does not require a showing of
subjective intent or even knowledge of the common nature of the rele-
vant activity. This is in line with courts' usage of "concerted action" in
other contexts. For example, courts have held that damages for inju-
ries originally caused by one party and later aggravated by another
party may be sought in one lawsuit against both parties, regardless of
whether the parties intended any relationship between their actions or
even whether the parties knew of any such possibility.273 In these
cases, as here, efficiency and perhaps even justice require that the
plaintiff be permitted to join the defendants in one lawsuit. Thus,
"concerted action" as used here refers to interrelated activities.
Focusing on the presence or absence of concerted action in the
sense of interrelated activities also gives meaning to the part of § 299
stating that "accused infringers may not be joined in one action as
defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consoli-
dated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each have
infringed the patent or patents in sUit."274 An allegation that two par-
ties infringe the same patent provides a logical way to group
271 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (analyzing questions of misjoinder
outside the context of patent infringement litigation).
272 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390-94 (2006) (rejecting
the Federal Circuit's "'general rule,' unique to patent disputes, 'that a permanent injunc-
tion will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged"' (quoting
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
273 See, e.g., McNeil v. Am. Export Lines, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 427, 428 (D. Pa. 1958)
(permitting joinder of two employers when the plaintiff claimed a back injury at a first
employer and aggravation of the back injury at a second employer); Lucas v. City of
Juneau, 127 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D. Ala. 1955) (permitting joinder of storeowner and city
when plaintiff claimed injuries due to a slip in the store and aggravation of those injuries
when the city's ambulance subsequently crashed).
274 35 U.S.C. § 299.
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actions.275 But merely identifying a logical way to group actions does
not further the goals of precluding unfair prejudice or minimizing
inefficient litigation practices. Indeed, an unconstrained conception of
the "logical relationship" test invites litigants to identify broad,
abstract relationships between two defendants. By contrast, allega-
tions of concerted action may indicate that the accused products or
processes are so similar that joinder should be permitted because of
increased efficiencies and a lack of undue hardship on the accused
infringers.276
B. Adopting an Efficient Procedure
The interpretation of "same" is not the only question presented
by § 299. One difficulty with the conclusions reached above is that
there are significant differences between the two interpretations of
"same accused product or process" when considering the costs of
implementation-that is, the amount of time and effort required to
address and resolve the question of the permissiveness of joinder
under either interpretation. In particular, it is relatively easy to iden-
tify when claims of infringement against multiple accused infringers
relate to one product or process. It is relatively difficult, by contrast,
to identify whether accused products are structurally or functionally
indistinguishable and whether accused processes are functionally
indistinguishable.
A second question thus concerns the procedure used to identify
whether accused products or processes are the "same." One possible
approach would limit the scope of the inquiry to the content of the
complaint. Another approach would allow some discovery on the
question at issue. Yet another approach would require completion of
the discovery process before a court decides whether to allow joinder.
On this question, the text of § 299 again provides little clear
direction.277 The legislative history, however, indicates that at least
275 See Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating, with
regard to Rule 13(a) governing counterclaims, "'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning.
It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the imme-
diateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." (quoting and citing Moore
v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926))).
276 See supra Part I.B.2 (concluding that the logical relationship test requires concerted
action).
277 The second part of 35 U.S.C. § 299 indicates that "accused infringers may not be
joined ... or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they
each have infringed the patent or patents in suit." Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
§ 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012) (amended 2013) (emphasis added). In context, the
reference to "allegations" of infringement appears unrelated to the question of whether
allegations-as opposed to evidence-of the existence of one product or indistinguishability
would be sufficient to prove that joinder is appropriate.
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some in Congress may have believed the approach taken in MyMail
should be rejected.278 If it is, then the procedure used to identify
whether accused products or processes are the same will not require
the fact discovery process to be complete.279 Considering policy-as
Judge Clark advocated during the negotiations over Rule 20-one
approach is to reduce the amount of resources wasted on procedural
disputes early in the case by liberalizing joinder to the extent that no
procedure would be necessary, because no party would be able to dis-
pute the appropriateness of joinder280 until just prior to a trial. To
reduce any hardship on defendants caused by improper joinder prior
to trial, however, some procedure to identify misjoinder is
necessary. 281
To the extent that the above analysis suggests that, in the absence
of significant transaction costs, an interpretation of "same" should
focus on the indistinguishability of accused products or processes, one
approach would be to apply this interpretation of "same" while mini-
mizing transaction costs to the greatest extent possible.
To minimize transaction costs, one approach is to hold that a
good faith allegation of indistinguishability-perhaps lodged in a com-
plaint based on recited facts relating to concerted action by accused
infringers-creates a rebuttable presumption that the accused prod-
ucts or processes are indistinguishable. Then, a court might hold that
the accused infringer bears the burden of rebutting the presumption
by proving that the accused products or processes are distinguishable
in relevant respects. 282 Given that alleged infringers control informa-
tion related to their accused products or processes, they should be
able to quickly and efficiently present evidence to the court regarding
any purported differences. After accused infringers attempt to rebut
the presumption of indistinguishability, the court might permit limited
278 See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 55 n.61 (2011) (noting legislative abrogation of
the construction of Rule 20(a) adopted in MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455
(E.D. Tex. 2004)).
279 See MyMail, Ltd., 223 F.R.D. at 457 (refusing to sever parties before completion of
discovery regarding the accused products).
280 NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 501-02 (statement of Charles E.
Clark, Dean, Yale Law School).
281 See id. at 505 (statement of Hon. George W. Wickersham, former Att'y Gen. of the
U.S.) ("I would not trust to the court where you have a substantive right of the defen-
dant. . . . I think the right of the defendant is to be sued under circumstances that protect
him . . . .").
282 Differences related to requirements of patent claims would qualify as relevant differ-
ences. Note, however, that by making successful arguments that products or processes are
distinguishable in relevant respects, an accused infringer may defeat any potential position
that non-mutual collateral estoppel should apply to any finding of non-infringement. Thus,
there are strategic reasons for accused infringers not to argue that accused products or
processes are different in relevant respects.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
716 [Vol. 88:652
PATENT MISJOINDER
discovery by patent owners. A court might further require parties to
file motions regarding misjoinder early in a case. By providing tight
controls on the procedure to challenge permissive joinder, courts
would further the overarching policy of focusing on the merits of par-
ties' disputes rather than on questions of procedure.
Significantly, Supreme Court precedent indicates that a focus on
the pleadings alone may be appropriate. As discussed above, in United
States v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court focused its inquiry on the
allegations in the complaint, not on any evidence developed through
discovery or other allegations in motion papers.283 This approach also
would be consistent with the policy favored by Judge Clark during the
drafting of Rule 20, because it would eliminate inefficiencies associ-
ated with costly discovery related to a procedural question.284
Ultimately, the procedure advocated here would enable a district
court to use its discretion with regard to trial management to reach a
conclusion regarding the question of joinder or consolidation for trial.
The approach would follow Federal Circuit jurisprudence, which
endorses broad district court discretion on case management mat-
ters. 28 5 A deferential approach would be particularly appropriate here
given the absence of any explicit procedure for determining whether
accused products or processes qualify as the "same." In effect,
Congress and the President have delegated authority to the courts to
interpret § 299 and to create an efficient procedure for its application.
C. Joining Substance and Procedure: Focusing on Good Faith
Allegations of Concerted Action
The best interpretation of § 299 would maximize efficiencies and
avoid undue prejudice to accused infringers while minimizing costs
283 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965).
284 See NOVEMBER 1935 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 501-02 (statement of Charles
E. Clark, Dean, Yale Law School). Another approach would be to treat the question of the
appropriateness of joinder as one of pleading, eliminating discovery related to the question
of whether the accused products or processes are the "same." However, this approach
would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach to Rule 23. The Supreme Court
recently highlighted that "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard" but instead
requires that a "party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compli-
ance with the Rule-that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact . . .
common questions of law or fact . . . ." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551 (2011). For similar reasons, it may be the patent owner that bears the ultimate burden
to prove the appropriateness of joinder of accused infringers and consolidation for trial
under § 299.
285 See, e.g., Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("A court has
broad discretion with regard to trial management."); Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797
F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Trial courts have the right and duty to manage proceed-
ings before them to insure both expedition and fairness, and must be granted a wide discre-
tion in carrying out that duty.").
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related to resolution of the question of the appropriateness of joinder
and consolidation. To do so, courts might focus on whether a com-
plaint includes a good faith allegation that the accused product or pro-
cess is indistinguishable based on concerted action of accused
infringers.
Courts might consider allegations of concerted action by accused
infringers as a signal that joinder is appropriate, and treat the allega-
tions as creating a rebuttable presumption that the accused products
or processes are in fact indistinguishable. The accused infringers
would then bear the burden of rebutting the presumption and proving
that joinder is inappropriate by introducing evidence that there was
no common scheme, or that the accused products or processes are in
fact different in relevant respects. In the absence of allegations of
indistinguishability based on concerted action, courts might adopt a
rebuttable presumption that joinder is inappropriate. The patent
owner would then bear the burden of rebutting the presumption and
proving that joinder is appropriate because there is a common
scheme286 and because the accused products or processes are in fact
indistinguishable in relevant respects.
The ability to name, and try claims against, multiple accused
infringers in one lawsuit, while creating efficiencies for courts and
patent owners, creates inefficiencies and potential prejudice for
accused infringers. 287 These inefficiencies, however, are likely mar-
ginal when the accused products or processes are indistinguishable in
any relevant respect and the accused infringers have acted in concert
with respect to those products or processes. Moreover, efficiencies will
likely be significant when the accused products or processes are
indistinguishable.
Indeed, there are significant public and private efficiencies associ-
ated with a standard that favors more liberal joinder and a procedure
that minimizes costs required to resolve the question of whether
joinder is appropriate. As for public efficiencies, courts should focus
on resolving substantive rather than procedural disputes. Further,
courts should not be required to resolve virtually identical disputes
multiple times. As for private efficiencies, a patent owner obviously
would reduce its total costs significantly by litigating infringement and
validity of its patent in one lawsuit rather than in multiple lawsuits.
286 To meet the same transaction or occurrence test that still exists in § 299, the patent
owner also will have to come forward with evidence that the asserted claims share an
aggregate of operative facts-or, in other words, that there is a common scheme. See supra
note 268 (recognizing the continued need to meet the same transaction or occurrence
requirement that was preserved from Rule 20).
287 See supra Part II.A.2.
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But even accused infringers would save money by cooperating with
each other, and cooperation seems likely and appropriate when the
accused products or processes are indistinguishable.
The ability to name and try claims against multiple defendants in
one lawsuit no doubt raises the possibility of unfair prejudice. 288
Unfair prejudice, however, likely would be marginal when the accused
products or processes are indistinguishable in any relevant respect and
when the accused infringers have acted in concert with respect to
those products or processes.
As for the procedure used to determine whether joinder of
accused infringers is proper, one that focuses on allegations in the
complaint, utilizes a rebuttable presumption, and minimizes discovery
would be efficient. A procedure that limits disputes regarding joinder
of accused infringers to allegations first and limited discovery next
would minimize costs borne both by courts and parties.
Thus, there are significant reasons for courts to resolve questions
regarding the application of § 299 by focusing on whether a complaint
includes a good faith allegation that the accused product or process is
indistinguishable based on subsidiary allegations related to concerted
action by accused infringers.
D. Effect on the Availability of Other Tools to Streamline Cases
Significantly, § 299 will control resolution of questions of permis-
sive joinder and consolidation for trial in most patent infringement
cases, regardless of which interpretation of the new statutory section
courts adopt. The new statutory section will also subject some patent
owners to litigating the same patent in different cases and, in some
instances, in different forums. It is thus important to highlight the
tools still available to district courts and patent owners for ensuring
the most efficient coordination and resolution of separate patent
infringement cases.
First, § 299 does not limit the ability of a court to "relate" sepa-
rate patent infringement cases. Applicable local rules, for example,
may require parties to notify the court when separate lawsuits involve
the same patent so that the court may assign the same judge to hear
both actions and thereby conserve judicial resources. 289 After relating
cases, the presiding judge may then take other actions to conserve
288 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that multiple accused infringers joined in one trial
could lead to jury confusion and that the added costs of joinder on accused infringers could
increase the prevalence of "strike suits").
289 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 3-12(a) ("An action is related to another when: (1)
The actions concern substantially the same parties, property, transaction or event; and (2)
It appears likely that there will be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense
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judicial resources and maximize efficiencies, including but not limited
to consolidating the cases for pretrial purposes if appropriate. While
courts may be reluctant to relate cases involving the same patents
after determining that joinder under Rule 20 is inappropriate, 290 there
should be a lower bar for consolidation for pretrial purposes as com-
pared to consolidation for trial.
Furthermore, unless § 299 has repealed it, Rule 21 gives district
courts discretion to add a party to a lawsuit.291 A court would not be
able to add a party using Rule 21 if the restriction on "joinder" in the
new statutory section applies to actions taken by courts.292 A textual
reading of the Act, however, supports the view that it does not limit
the ability of courts to add parties pursuant to Rule 21.293 In short,
given the particular language used in the AIA-"joined" and "consol-
idated for trial"294-it appears that Rule 21 is not repealed in patent
infringement actions covered by § 299.
Similar to courts retaining the ability to relate separate cases or
consolidate actions for pretrial purposes, potential infringers retain the
ability to intervene in appropriate patent infringement cases to con-
serve resources. Section 19(d) of the AIA does not repeal Rule 24; in
particular, it does not repeal subsection (b) of Rule 24, which permits
intervention when a party "has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact" and intervention will
not "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties'
rights."295 This continued ability to intervene may prove useful for
potential infringers not joined in a lawsuit by a patent owner. 296 Of
or conflicting results if the cases are conducted before different Judges."); R. Cr. FED. CL.
40.2(a)(2) ("[C]ases are directly related when: ... they involve the same . . . patent.").
290 See, e.g., WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL
3895047, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) ("Given the disparity in defendants, accused prod-
ucts, and other disparate issues discussed herein like damages, wilfulness, and discovery
supervision, it is worth adding that the allegations against each remaining defendant would
not be related under our civil local rules even if brought here as separate actions." (citing
N.D. CAL. Civ. L.R. 3-12(a)(2))).
291 FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action.
On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The
court may also sever any claim against a party.").
292 As discussed above, this appears to be Senator Kyl's interpretation. See supra notes
242-55 and accompanying text (analyzing Senator Kyl's statement made during the floor
debate over the AIA).
293 See supra notes 242-51 and accompanying text (comparing textual language to legis-
lative history).
294 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 19(d), 35 U.S.C. § 299 (Supp. V 2012)
(amended 2013).
295 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B), (b)(3).
296 For example, a company with a relatively strong interest in a case may seek to inter-
vene to prevent settlement or the creation of harmful precedent. See, e.g., Reid v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 240 F.R.D. 257 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (permitting a company to intervene in a
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course, patent owners not joining potential infringers is the opposite
of the presumed problem that § 299 seeks to address, excessive
joinder.
Section 19(d) of the AIA also does not alter a district court's
ability to join any or all matters for a common hearing or to consoli-
date actions for pretrial purposes under Rule 42. Furthermore, courts
have treated questions of consolidation for pretrial purposes sepa-
rately from consolidation for trial. In MLR, LLC v. U.S. Robotics
Corp., a patent infringement case, a district court found that one com-
pany was not properly joined in a lawsuit with six other defendants
pursuant to Rule 20.297 In particular, the plaintiff failed to allege that
the defendants' products were related and thus did not meet the
common transaction or occurrence element. of Rule 20(a). 298 The
court noted, however, that "even if [defendants are] not properly
joined, cases involving different defendants may be ripe for consolida-
tion." 299 The court ultimately consolidated the severed case against
the one defendant with the original case involving the six other defen-
dants for pretrial purposes because of the overlapping common ques-
tions of law and fact.300
If the purpose of § 299 is to "allow[ ] unrelated patent defendants
to insist on being tried separately,"3 0 1 then joining matters for a
common hearing and consolidating actions, short of consolidation for
trial, does not contradict that purpose. Moreover, joining matters for
hearing and consolidating cases for pretrial purposes would allow for
certain efficiencies. In particular, consolidation would facilitate
holding a common claim construction hearing, which may be efficient
depending on the circumstances. Consolidation for pretrial purposes
may also allow for efficiencies associated with common discovery mat-
ters, such as depositions of inventors and patent attorneys.
Finally, consider the potential for creating multiple lawsuits
involving the same patent and the subsequent transfer of some of
those lawsuits to far-flung forums pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Transfer is particularly possible if a court does not consider benefits
associated with maintaining multiple lawsuits in one venue so that
they can be related or consolidated for pretrial purposes.302
patent infringement lawsuit against its customers after one such customer sought
indemnity).
297 No. 02 C 2898, 2003 WL 685504, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003).
298 Id. at *2.
299 Id. at *3.
300 Id.
301 See 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
302 See, e.g., In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[I]n the
circumstances of this case, we cannot say [the patent owner filing suit against another
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Maintenance of multiple lawsuits involving the same patent in far-
flung forums may waste judicial resources as well as create the poten-
tial for issue preclusion against patent owners.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel) may
be useful when joinder is inappropriate in patent infringement actions.
In particular, the MDL Panel may order consolidation of lawsuits
from separate forums for pretrial purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a). While it might seem that such consolidation under
§ 1407(a) would be inconsistent with a district court's prior order to
transfer the case under § 1404(a), the Federal Circuit has held that the
considerations pertinent to these two provisions are not the same.303
A court grants a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) for the "con-
venience of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice." 304
The focus of this analysis, however, is on convenience at trial.305 By
contrast, the MDL Panel grants a motion for consolidation under
§ 1407(a) if there is "one or more common questions of fact" and
transfer "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 306 The focus
of this analysis is on convenience and efficiency of coordinated pretrial
proceedings. While it may be true that convenience or efficiency for
purposes of trial counsels in favor of transfer of a particular case from
one forum to another, convenience and efficiency for pretrial pur-
poses may counsel that the same case, now transferred, be consoli-
dated with other cases from its original forum.
Thus, even after passage of the AIA, patent owners and district
courts still have various tools to coordinate separate patent infringe-
ment cases to reduce costs.
CONCLUSION
The new statutory section governing permissive joinder and con-
solidation in most patent cases targets the Eastern District of Texas. It
defendant in the same forum] negates the significance of having trial close to where most
of the identified witnesses reside and where the other convenience factors clearly favor.").
303 See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 964 F.2d 1128, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The
denial of a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) does not bar coordination of pretrial proce-
dures under § 1407. The considerations pertinent to a change of venue under § 1404(a) are
not the same as those pertinent to coordination of pretrial proceedings in multiple cases
involving common parties." (citations omitted)).
304 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
305 See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that
"private" interest factors involved in transfer analysis under § 1404(a) deal with "practical
problems that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive").
306 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). For practical insights into the operation of the MDL
Panel and its interpretation of its statutory mandate, see John G. Heyburn II, A View from
the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225 (2008).
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reflects concern that patent owners may be using permissive joinder to
forum shop and increase the cost of litigation for accused infringers.
My empirical analysis appears to confirm this strategic conduct by
patent owners by recognizing a consistent increase in the number of
accused infringers named in initial complaints filed in the Eastern
District of Texas in the years prior to enactment of the AIA. To limit
patent owners' ability to engage in this conduct, the new statutory sec-
tion overturns an interpretation and application of Rules 20 and 42
that was followed in most cases in that forum. Moving forward, § 299
should be interpreted to further the goals of improving efficiency
while avoiding undue prejudice to accused infringers. To do so, the
standard for determining whether joinder of accused infringers and
consolidation for trial is inappropriate should focus, in the first
instance, on whether accused infringers acted in concert and, ulti-
mately, on whether the accused products or processes are
indistinguishable.
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APPENDIX:
INITIAL COMPLAINTS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES FILED IN
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA
This study analyzed initial complaints alleging patent infringe-
ment307 originally filed in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern
District of Texas and the Northern District of California 308 from
January 1, 2008 through September 15, 2011. The study covered 1018
complaints filed in the Eastern District of Texas and 404 complaints
filed in the Northern District of California. For each complaint, the
number of defendants and the number of defendants with an identi-
fied tie to the forum state were recorded, as well as whether the com-
plaint identified any plaintiff as having a tie to the forum state.309
I selected 2008 as the first year of the study in order to consider
over nine months of data prior to the issuance of the seminal opinion
that ultimately resulted in the slew of orders requiring the Eastern
District of Texas to transfer cases. 310 I continued the study through
September 15, 2011, which extends the study up to the day before the
effective date of § 299.311
307 The study excluded complaints that requested only declaratory judgments of non-
infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability and did not also allege patent infringement,
even though an answer might include counterclaims alleging infringement.
308 The study of either forum excluded complaints originally filed in any other forum.
For example, if the Eastern District of Texas transferred a case originally filed in the
Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, the complaint counted
toward the statistics associated with the Eastern District of Texas and not toward the statis-
tics associated with the Northern District of California. As another example, if the District
of Delaware transferred a case originally filed in the District of Delaware to the Northern
District of California, the complaint did not count toward any statistics in the study.
309 For corporate entities, the study considers a tie to the forum state to include the
identification of incorporation, headquarters, or principal place of business in the forum
state. For individuals, the study considers a tie to the forum state to include the identifica-
tion of residency in the forum state.
310 The Fifth Circuit issued an en banc opinion related to the resolution of motions to
transfer for inconvenient forum on October 10, 2008. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545
F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The Federal Circuit repeatedly relied upon this case to
order the Eastern District of Texas to transfer cases. See, e.g., In re Verizon Bus. Network
Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Volkswagen and ordering the Eastern
District of Texas to transfer the case to a more convenient forum); In re Zimmer Holdings,
Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (same); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same). I hypothe-
sized that patent owners may have altered their filing strategies based on the holdings in
these cases.
311 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(e), 125 Stat. 284, 333
(2011) ("The amendments made by this section shall apply to any civil action commenced
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act."); Press Release, Office of the Press
Sec'y, supra note 2 (announcing that President Obama signed the AIA on September 16,
2011).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
724 [Vol. 88:652
PATENT MISJOINDER
I selected the Northern District of California and the Eastern
District of Texas given that they comprise two of the top four districts
in terms of numbers of filing of patent cases in the calendar years
covered by the study;312 given that scholars have compared these dis-
tricts in the past with respect to choice of venue;313 given the con-
trasting views of judges in these forums regarding the appropriateness
of joinder of accused infringers;314 given the unique circumstance that
the Federal Circuit has ordered the Eastern District of Texas to
transfer patent infringement cases nine times in recent years without
ordering the Northern District of California to transfer any cases; 315
and given the unique role of the Eastern District of Texas in moti-
vating members of Congress to vote for the AIA and the new statu-
tory section repealing Rule 20 in most patent infringement cases.3 16
The following table summarizes the overall results of my study
for the entire time period under consideration:
312 According to statistics maintained by Lex Machina, the Eastern District of Texas
ranked first, second, and third out of all federal district courts in terms of the number of
patent cases filed in 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. The Northern District of California
ranked fourth in each of these three years.
313 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1466 (2010)
(identifying beneficial effects of patent owners selecting the Northern District of California
and the Eastern District of Texas).
314 Compare, e.g., MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
(holding that pre-discovery joinder is appropriate when the defendants are all alleged to
have infringed the same patent because the issue of the asserted patent's scope is common
to all and because the court cannot determine whether all of the claims arise out of the
same series of transactions until the completion of discovery), with WiAV Networks, LLC
v. 3Com Corp., No. C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (holding
that joinder of defendants all alleged to have infringed the same patent is not appropriate
if the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants acted in concert because discovery and
claim construction issues will vary among the different defendants).
315 See supra note 24 (listing nine Federal Circuit opinions ordering the Eastern District
of Texas to transfer patent infringement cases); supra note 175 (indicating that a search of
Westlaw for any opinion by the Federal Circuit ordering the Northern District of
California to transfer a patent infringement failed to identify any such opinion).
316 See 157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
("This provision effectively codifies current law as it has been applied everywhere outside
of the Eastern District of Texas.").
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Eastern District of Northern District of
Texas California
Mean Number of Defendants 9.1 2.4
Mean Number of Defendants with 1.2 1.0
Identified Tie to Forum State
Median Number of Defendants 4 1
Median Number of Defendants with 0 1
Identified Tie to Forum State
Mean Quarterly Percentage of Defendants 12% 41%
with Identified Tie to Forum State
The following figures illustrate the changes in filing strategies by
patent owners over the time period:
FIGURE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS PER PATENT CASE
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FIGURE 4
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